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PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS AND THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
NANCY R. SCHEMBRI*
Although one may perceive prenuptial agreements as a
phenomenon of the latter part of the 20th century, in fact they
are not.' However, traditionally, prenuptial agreements, also
known as "premarital agreements" or "antenuptial agreements,"2
were met with much hostility by courts. 3 This negative response
was based upon feelings that prenuptial agreements were
against public policy because, supposedly, they fostered divorce. 4
Candidate for J.D., St John's University School of Law June 2003.
1 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 346 (1976) (exploring validity of
prenuptial agreement); DeMaggio v. DeMaggio, 317 So. 2d 848, 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (invalidating prenuptial agreement prior to 1980); Appleby v. Estates of Appleby,
100 Minn. 408, 424 (1907) (stating that individuals have right to enter into enforceable
prenuptial agreement);) Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn. App. 220, 225 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940)
(commenting on prenuptial agreements prior to 1950).
2 See In re Marriage of Leathers, 309 Or. 625, 630 n.5 (1990) (explaining prenuptial is
synonymous with premarital or antenuptial agreements); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80
Wash. 2d 293, 298 (1972) (commenting that "prenuptial" and "antenuptial" agreements
are synonymous); Suzanne D. Albert, The Perils of Premarital Provisions, 48 R.I. BAR. J.
5, 5 (2000) (stating that prenuptial, premarital and antenuptial agreements are
synonymous).
3 See Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Alaska 1987) (noting prenuptial
agreements were traditionally viewed as contrary to marriage); Laura P. Graham, The
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and Modern Social Policy: The Enforceability of
Premantal Agreements Regulating the Ongoing Marriage, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037,
1038 (1993) (noting prenuptials were not always regarded favorably). See generally
Stephen P. Stanczak, Note, For Better or For Worse... But Just in Case, Are
Antenuptial Agreements Enforceable, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 531, 534 (1982) (discussing
how at common law prenuptial agreements were thought to be fostering divorce).
4 See Janet L. Dolgin, Solomon's Dilemma: Exploring Parental Rights: The "Intent" of
Reproduction: Reproductive Technologies: The Parent-Child Bond, 26 CoNN. L. REV.
1261, 1268 (1994) (noting in the past prenuptial agreements were thought to favor
divorce); Peter Sevareid, Increase In Value of Separate Property In Pennsylvania: A
Change in What Women Want, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 557, 596 (1995) (stating that in the
past courts disfavored prenuptial agreements in cases of divorce); William F. Fraatz,
Comment, Enforcing Antenuptial Contracts In Minnesota: A Practice in Search of a Policy
Basis in the Wake of McKee-Johnson v Johnson, 77 MINN. L. REV. 441, 444 (1992)
(acknowledging prior decisions which disfavor prenuptial agreements).
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This sentiment was clearly evident in many court decisions. 5
However, in recent years, the increase in divorce rates6 has made
prenuptial agreements a more realistic alternative to a "messy
break-up."7  Another reason for the rise in the number of
prenuptial agreements might be that in recent years the elective
share right of surviving spouses has been enlarged. Concurrent
with prenuptial agreements gaining increased popular public
support, is an increasing judicial recognition of their validity.8
Perhaps one reason for the rise in popularity is the very purpose
behind the agreement itself.9 Unlike many other arm's-length
contracts, prenuptial agreements are treated rather differently in
the legal context. 10 Many courts have stated that the very nature
of the relationship between an engaged couple, unlike that in
5 See Brooks, 733 P.2d at 1048 (explaining that traditionally prenuptial agreements
were disfavored); Rinvelt v. Rinvelt, 190 Mich. App. 372, 380 (1991) (noting traditional
view that prenuptial agreements were "inconsistent" with ideals of marriage); Brian H.
Bix, Premarital Agreements in the ALl Principles of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 231, 233 (2001) [hereinafter Bix, Premarital Agreements] (stating
that prenuptial agreements were presumptively unenforceable because they were
'considered contrary to public policy").
6 See Harry M. Clor, Forum on Public Morality: The Death of Public Morality 45
AM. J. JURIS. 33, 42 (2000) (stating that divorce rate is "close to 50%"); Allison A. Marston,
Note, Planning for Love: The Politics of PrenuptialAgreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887, 891
(1997) (noting "prevalence" of divorce); Alex Shukman, Notes & Comments, Show Her the
Money: The California Court ofAppeal's Mistake Concerning In Re Marriage ofBonds, 20
Loy. L.A_ ENT. L.J. 457, 457-58 (2000) (noting half of marriages end in divorce).
7 See Bob Egelko, Bonds' Pact with Ex- Wife Binding; Court Says Prenuptial Signing
is Legal Even if She Had No Lawyer, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Aug. 22, 2000, at A3
(stating that prenuptial agreements are means of protecting premarital assets); David E.
Rovella, More Couples Getting Prenuptial Agreements to Shield Assets, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 2,
1999, at 1 (acknowledging that prenuptial agreements make divorce "less painful" for
parties involved); Vivian Wagner, Don't Wait Until the Last Minute to Work Out
Agreement, PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 2, 2000, at 1D (commenting that prenuptial agreements
foster "peace of mind" with regard to protecting assets).
8 See, e.g.; Fleming v. Fleming, 474 So. 2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(validating prenuptial agreement); McGuire v. McGuire, 385 So.2d 151, 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (upholding validity of prenuptial agreement); In re Estate of Serbus, 324
N.W.2d 381, 386 (Minn. 1982) (commenting that prenuptial is valid).
9 See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 50 SMU L. REV. 1189,
1212 (1997) (acknowledging that increasing premarital agreements allows for allotment of
personal and community property); Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce: Liability Without
Fault: Can Family Law Learn From Torts 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 72 (1991) (stating that
increased "exploration" by parties allows to deal with possible concerns in advance);
Marston, supra, note 6, at 916 (noting that prenuptial agreements allow for open
communication and thus are "relationship-enhancing").
10 See Tenneboe v. Tenneboe, 558 So.2d 470, 474 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990) (acknowledging
that parties to prenuptial agreement do not deal at "arm's length"); Humphries v.
Humphries, No. E1999-02694, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 455, at *23 (Tenn. Ct. App. July
18, 2000) (stating that parties to antenuptial agreement do not deal at "arm's length"); In
re Estate of Crawford, 107 Wash. 2d 493, 497 (1986) (noting that parties to prenuptial
agreements do not deal at "arm's length").
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many other contracts, is highly personal and confidential and
fosters a finding of a fiduciary relationship.'] Although unlike
many contracts, they are nonetheless a contract and, as such, are
given the same legal enforceability.12 Due to the unique
relationship of the parties involved in a prenuptial agreement, an
attorney representing these parties has not only a different
relationship but different responsibilities to the parties as well. 13
In order to fully gain an understanding of this area of law, a
clear definition is needed as to what a prenuptial agreement
truly is. Many have attempted to define what is encompassed in
the term prenuptial agreement.14 A prenuptial agreement is "a
contract entered into between a man and a woman in
contemplation and consideration of their future marriage,
whereby the property rights and economic interests of either the
prospective husband or wife, or both, are determined as set
forth."15 It is also important to understand what is encompassed
within the four-corners of a premarital agreement. Premarital
contracts may address financial considerations, such as division
I I See Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17, 21 (Fla. 1962) (stating relationship
between parties to prenuptial agreement is of trust); In re Estate of Benker, 416 Mich.
681, 688-89 (1982) (discussing relationship of parties to prenuptial agreement is of
'extreme mutual confidence"); In re Marriage of Leathers, 309 Or. 625, 631 (1990)
(commenting that nature of relationship between parties "imposes fiduciary duties in
transactions between them").
12 See Elgar v. Elgar, 238 Conn. 839, 852 (1996) (explaining that "duly executed
antenuptial agreement is" presumed legal "as any other contract..."); In re of Garbade,
221 AD.2d 844, 845 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (noting prenuptial agreement are given same
enforceability as "any other contract"); Panossian v. Panossian, 172 A.D.2d 811, 811 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1991) (stating "a duly executed antenuptial agreement is given the same
presumption of legality as any other contract. ..).
13 See Andrew J. Kyreakakis, Antenuptial Law in New Jersey, 24 SETON HALL L.
REV. 254, 254 (1993) (acknowledging that few areas of law are similar to prenuptial
agreements in that they are "emotionally charged" and expose attorneys to risks);
Franklin I. Miroff & Andrew C. Mallor, When a Simple "I do' Won't Do: How to Draft a
Premarital Agreement - And Survive, 13 FAM. ADvOc. 10, 14 (1991) (suggesting that
prenuptial agreements often create litigation); Marston, supra note 6, at 893 (noting
difficulty lawyers face in drafting prenuptial agreements).
14 See, e.g., McVicar v. McVicar, 128 Kan. 394, 395 (1929) (explaining what is
encompassed in prenuptial agreement); Crawford, 107 Wash.2d at 493-94 (1986) (defining
prenuptial agreement); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash.2d 293, 298-99 (1972)
(providing definition of prenuptial agreement).
Is Rowland v. Rowland, 74 Ohio App.3d 415, 419 (1991) (providing that "antenuptial
agreement is a contract entered into between a man and a woman in contemplation and
consideration of their future marriage"); see Barbara Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering
Concerns about the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J. Legis. 127, 140 (1993)
(suggesting that prenuptial agreements enforced in attempt to preserve freedom of
contract "and the concomitant predictability in arranging one's future financial affairs");
Marston, supra note 6, at 901 (commenting that state implies contract into marriage
without parties' involvement).
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of property and support payments upon death or divorce, lifestyle
considerations, as well as many other stipulations. One couple
went as far as stipulating in their prenuptial agreement what
type of gas they will buy and how often each week they will
engage in sexual intercourse.16 As one can see, prenuptial
agreements can be tailored to the need of the engaged couple.
Currently, prenuptial agreements are not only deemed valid,17
but in some instances are considered favorable to public policy'8
and the institution of marriage as well.19 In recent years the
number of divorces in the United States has grown rapidly,20
and, as indicated above, there has been an increase in the
number of prenuptial agreements. 21 Since this is not a "typical"
16 See Teresa Garpstas and Robert Rex LeGalley, Unconditional Love Excerpt from
Prenuptial Agreement, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Feb. 1996, at 24 (presenting excerpts from
LeGalley's sixteen page prenuptial agreement); see also Gary Belsky, Living by the Rules,
MONEY, May 1996, at 100 (commenting on sixteen page prenuptial agreement covering
virtually every area of married life); Barbara Hetzer, A Binding Agreement Before You
Tie The Knot, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 3, 1997, at 114 (noting terms of LeGalley prenuptial
agreement).
17 See, e.g., Fleming v. Fleming, 474 So.2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(validating a prenuptial agreement); McGuire v. McGuire, 385 So.2d 151, 151 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980) (upholding the validity of a prenuptial agreement); Serbus v. Serbus, 324
N.W.2d 381, 386 (Minn. 1982) (commenting that prenuptial is valid). See generally
Christine Davis, Note & Comment, 'Til Debt Do Us Part: Premarital Contracting Around
Community Property Law - An Evaluation of Schlaefer v. Financial Management Service,
Inc., 32 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1051, 1053 (2000) (noting however that in order for court to
determine issue of prenuptial agreement's validity issue must be raised by the parties).
18 See Craig C. Conley, Comment, Family Law - Randolph v. Randolph: Tennessee
Requires Full Disclosure or Independent Knowledge for Antenuptial Agreements to Be
Valid, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1997) (commenting that prenuptial agreements are
favored in public policy); Carolyn Counce, Comment, Family Law-Cary v. Cary:
Antenuptial Agreements Waiving or LimitingAiimony in Tennessee, 27 U. MEM. L. REV.
1041, 1056 (1997) (explaining prenuptial agreements are favored in public policy); Nora J.
Lauerman, Feminist, Moral, Social, and Legal Theory. A Step Toward Enhancing
Equality, Choice, and Opportunity to Develop in Mamriage and Divorce, 56 U. CIN. L. REV.
493, 513-14 (1987) (noting prenuptial agreements are favored by public policy).
19 See Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1050 (Alaska 1987) (noting that thinking
through marriage in preparation for a prenuptial agreement is positive to institution of
marriage); Rinvelt v. Rinvelt, 190 Mich. App. 372, 381 (Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that
"allowing couples to think through their marriage before can only foster strength and
permanency in the relationship."); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash.2d 293, 301 (1972)
(stating that prenuptial agreements "freely and intelligently made" contribute to marital
tranquility).
20 See Cara L. Brown & Duncan V. Baddeley: A Case Comment, 37 ALBERTA L. REV.
772, 798 (1999) (finding increase in divorce rates since 1971); Allison Nicole DeGregorio,
Single and Bankrupt: What Right Does a Debtor Have To Marry 15 BANK. DEV. J. 427,
427 (1999) (announcing increase in percentage of divorces); Lynne M. Kenney & Diana
Vigil, A Lawyer's Guide to Therapeutic Interventions in Domestic Relations Court, 28
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 629, 642 (1996) (noting increase in divorce rate).
21 See Marston, supra note 6, at 891 (commenting on increase of prenuptial
agreements in recent years); see also James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75
IND. L.J. 875, 937 (2000) (commenting on popularity of prenuptial agreements); Bob
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contract situation where the parties deal at "arm's length",22 the
obligations of the parties and attorneys involved are also not
typical. 23 The rules adopted regarding prenuptial agreements
differ according to each jurisdiction.2 4
JOINT-REPRESENTATION AND ETHICS
The Mode] Rules
The topic of joint-representation is encompassed in the broad
category that is deemed ethics or professional responsibility. 25
The code of ethics is perhaps one of the most integral sources in
governing an attorney's ethical behavior. 26 The larger question is
who promulgates these rules. The resounding answer is in large
Egelko, supra note 7, at A-3 (discussing increase in prenuptial agreements popularity).
22 See Atwood, supra note 15, at 132 (concluding that prenuptial agreements are not
like other arm's length commercial contracts); Sanford N. Katz, Propter Honons
Respectum: Marriage as Partnership, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1261 n.34 (1998)
(explaining that parties to prenuptial agreement deal with "mutual trust"); see also John
A. Gromala, Mediation in Estate Planning and Will or Trust Contests, THE CPA
JOURNAL, Sept. 1, 2001, at 54 (noting couples might not have discussed terms of
prenuptial agreement at arm's length).
23 See Kyreakakis, supra note 13, at 254 (acknowledging that few areas of law are
similar to prenuptial agreements in that they are "emotionally charged" and expose
attorneys to risks); Marston, supra note 6, at 893 (noting the difficulty lawyers face in
drafting prenuptial agreements); Miroff & Mallor, supra note 13, at 14 (1991) (explaining
that prenuptial agreements often create litigation).
24 See Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1880-81
(1995) (commenting on different enforcement of prenuptial agreements by states); P.
Andre Katc and Amanda Clayman, When Your Elderly Clients Marry: Prenuptial
Agreements and Other Considerations, 16 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 445, 446
(2000) (discussing each state has laws that govern prenuptial agreements); Shukhman,
supra note 6, at 457 (noting lack of uniformity in states regarding prenuptial
agreements).
25 See Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?" Ethical Community Lawyering, 7
CLINICAL L. REV. 147, 192 (2000) (discussing joint-representation is governed by ethical
codes); Robert W. Tuttle, The Fiduciary's Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary
Representation, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 915 (1994) (noting joint representation is
encompassed in ethics); Nicole G. Tell, Note, Representing Police Officers and
Municipalities: A Conflict of Interest for a Municipal Attorney in a § 1983 Police
Misconduct Suit, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 2837 (1997) (finding joint representation
conflicts are within bounds of ethics).
26 See Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., The Revised Lawyer Discipline Process in Arkansas:
A Primer and Analysis, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 13, 14-15 (1998) (explaining
attorney's obligations under code of ethics); Frederic G. Corneel, The Service and the
Private Practitioner: Face to Face and Hand to hand - A Private Practitioner's View, 11
AM. J. TAX POL'Y 343, 363 (1994) (noting attorneys are governed by code of ethics);
Richard Lieb, Bankruptcy Ethics: Article: The Section 327(a) "Disinterestedness"
Requirement - Does a Pre-petition Claim Disqualify an Attorney for Employment by a
Debtor in Possession, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 101, 121 (1997) (commenting that state
code of ethics imposes ethical responsibilities upon attorneys).
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part the American Bar Association (ABA).27 The first attempt by
the American Bar Association to promulgate a code of ethics was
in 1908 in creating the Canons of Professional Ethics. 28 Later, in
1970, the American Bar Association proposed the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility,29 which has been adopted in some
fashion in all of the states.30 The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility has three main components: the Canons,31 Ethical
Considerations32 and Disciplinary Rules. 33 After the adoption of
27 See Audrey Rogers, New Insights on Waiver and the Inadvertent Disclosure of
Privileged Materials and Attorney Responsibility as Governing Precept, 47 FLA. L. REV.
159, 179 (1995) (noting ABA promulgates rules); John P. Sahl, The Public Hazard of
Lawyers Self-Regulation: Learning from Ohio's Struggle to Reform Its Disciplinary
System, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 65, 67 (1999) (examining ABA's promulgation of rules);
Matthew Garner Mercer, Note, Lawyer Advertising on the Internet: the ABA's Proposed
Revisions to the Advertising Rules Replace the Flat Tire with a Square Wheel, 39
BRANDEIS L.J. 713, 714 (2001) (commenting that ABA promulgates rules).
28 See Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to
Include the Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C.L. REV. 923, 952 (1996)
(stating the Canons of Professional Ethics was enacted in 1908); Pamela A. Kentra, Hear
No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil The Intolerable Conflict for Attorney-Mediators
Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation Confidentiality and the Duty to Report Fellow
Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L. REV. 715, 741 (1997) (announcing the Canons of
Professional Ethics was promulgated in 1908); Marston, supra note 6, at 505 (concluding
in 1908 the Canons of Professional ethics were enacted).
29 See Flowers, supra note 28, at 952 (noting 1970 passing of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility); Bruce A. Green, Special Issue Institutional Choices in the
Regulation of Lawyers: Article and Response: Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The
Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 77 (1996) (commenting on the 1970 passing of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility); Randy Santore & Alan D. Viard, Legal Fee
Restrictions, Moral Hazard, and Attorney Rents, 44 J. LAW & ECON. 549, 552 (2001)
(explaining that Canon was replaced in 1970 by Model Code of Professional
Responsibility).
30 See Flowers, supra note 28, at 952 (noting that Model Code has been adopted in
some form by every state); David J. Hrina, Comment, The Future of JOLTA: Has the
Death Knell Been Sounded for Mandatory IOLTA Programs, 32 AKRON L. REV. 301, 304
n.23 (1999) (stating that Model Code has been adopted by almost every state supreme
court); Joseph D. Vaccaro & Marc R. Milano, Note, Section 327 (a): A Statute in Conflict:
A proposed Solution to Conflicts of Interest in Bankruptcy, 5 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
237, 242-43 (1997) (commenting on majority of states adopting some form of the Model
Code).
31 See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, Can a Reasonable Doubt Have an
Unreasonable Price? Limitations of Attorneys' Fees in Criminal Cases, 41 B.C.L. REV. 1,
14 n.60 (1999) (noting Canon is general standard for attorneys relating to public); Nancy
B. Rapoport, Turning & Turning in the Widening Gyre: The Problem of Potential
Conflicts of Interest in Bankruptcy, 26 CONN. L. REV. 913, 941 (1994) (explaining that
Canons define .what conduct is expected of attorneys); Alexander G. Benisatto & Alyson
M. Fiedler, Note, The Disinterested Standard of Section 327(a): Applying an Equitable
Solution for Potential Conflicts on Small Bankruptcies, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 363,
365 (1999) (commenting Canons are suggestive guidelines for courts to use).
32 See Chin & Wells, supra note 31, at 14 n.60 (noting that attorneys should aspire to
follow the Ethical Considerations); Rapoport, supra note 31, at 941(explaining that
Ethical Considerations are guidelines for attorneys to act ethically); Benisatto & Fiedler,
supra note 31, at 365 (commenting that Ethical Considerations are what attorneys should
strive to be).
[Vol. 17:313
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the 1970 Model Code the ABA again in 1977 attempted, under
Kutak Commission, 34 to create a new set of Model Rules that
were adopted by the House of Delegates in 1983.35 The ABA
continues its quest to perfect the Model Rules and as a result the
Ethics 2000 Committee was appointed to again propose changes
to the existing rules. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as
they are now called, have two important aspects to keep in mind.
First, they are only "model" rules, they are not statutes. 36 Second,
these rules were promulgated by the ABA not the legislature,37
and therefore the ABA has no legal authority or power to enforce
them.38 Accordingly, one might wonder what is the effect if any of
these Model Rules? As stated earlier different jurisdictions chose
to adopt some form of the rules, and as such there is a degree of
33 See Chin & Wells, supra note 31, at 14 n.60 (noting disciplinary rules are
mandatory ethical rules for lawyers); Rapoport, supra note 31, at 941(explaining that
Disciplinary Rules are minimum standard required of attorneys); Benisatto & Fiedler,
supra note 31, at 365 (commenting that Disciplinary Rules are a mandatory standard to
be followed by lawyers).
34 See George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss Prevention: A
Comparative Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 305, 308 (1997/1998)
(stating ABA in 1977 under Kutak Commission reexamined Model Code); Suzanne F.
Day, Note, The Supreme Court's Attack on Attorneys' Freedom of Expression: The Gentile
v. State Bar of Nevada Decision, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1347, 1370 (1993) (discussing
Kutak Commission's role in examination and replacing Model Code); Michael M. Nelter,
Government Scapegoatmg, Duty to Disclose, and the S&L Crisis: Can Lawyers and
Accountants Avoid Liability in the Savings and Loan Wilderness, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 655,
674 (1993) (explaining 1977 Kutak Commission drafted a replacement for Model Code).
35 See Chin & Wells, supra note 31, at 14 n.61 (discussing House of Delegates adopted
the Model Rules in 1983); John M. A. DiPippa, Lawyers, Clients, and Money, 18 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 95, 100 n.43 (1995) (stating in 1983 House of Delegates passed
Model Rules); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Article, A New Antidote for an Opponent's
Pretrial Discovery Misconduct: Treating the Misconduct at Trial as an Admission by
Conduct of the Weakness of the Opponent's Case, 1993 BYU L. REV. 793, 795 n. 10 (1993)
(noting House of Delegates passed Model Rules in 1983).
36 See Stephen E. Kalish, How to Encourage Lawyer to be Ethical: Do Not Use the
Ethics Codes as a Basis for Regular Law Decisions, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 649, 669
n.86 (2000) (arguing that Model Rules are not "analogous" to statutes because they are
not passed by representative body); Rory K Little, Law Professors as Lawyers:
Consultants, Of Counsel and the Ethics of Self-Flagellation, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 345, 357
n.45 (2001) (explaining that Model Rules can be adopted by states in statutes); N. Gregory
Smith, Missed Opportunities: Louisiana's Version of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 61
LA. L. REV. 1, 32 (2000) (discussing statutes may circumscribe Model Rules).
37 Supra note 27 and accompanying text.
38 See Marion L. Ferry, Note, Estate of Younger: Violation of an Ethical Consideration
Equal a Legal Presumption, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 719, 738 (1984) (discussing that Model
Rules should be passed by legislature of states); Brooke Parker, Comment, Dangers of the
"Revolving Door" Disqualification of Attorneys because of Prior Government Public
Service, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 317, 329 (1997/1998) (explaining that it is not mandatory for
states to follow Model Rules); Lesley E. Williams, Note, The Civil Regulation of
Prosecutors, 67 FORDHAm L. REV. 3441, 3443 n.20 (1999) (stating Model Rules have no
legal effect until adopted by states).
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deference to the weight of authority that the jurisdiction will
afford the rule.39 In People v. Herr,40 the court stated that it will
view the rules as "guidelines to be applied with due regard for
the broad range of interest at stake."41 In federal court, however,
the decision of whether to adopt the rules is a question of federal
law.42 Basically the interpretation and weight of the rules is
dependent upon the jurisdiction.43
In our discussion of prenuptial agreements the Model Rules
are a pivotal point in the discussion. How can an attorney
represent both parties to a prenuptial? One might think that
there has to be some rule against this type of joint representation
and lack of independent counsel. It appears that there are many
rules that speak to these issues. One such rule is Model Rule 1.7
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.44 Model Rule 1.7
provides for the following:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
of that client will be directly adverse to another client,
unless:
1. The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will
not adversely affect the relationship with the other client;
and
39 See G. Ellis Duncan, Comment, The Rise of Multidisciplinary Practices in Europe
and the Future of the Global Legal Profession Following Arthur Andersen v. Netherlands
Bar Ass'n, 9 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 537, 555 (2001) (announcing that Model Rules are
not binding on states until adopted); Michael W. Price, Comment, A New Millennium's
Resolution: The ABA Continues Its Regrettable Ban on Multidisciplinary Practice, 37
HOUS. L. REV. 1495, 1501 (2000) (explaining Model Rules are not binding authority until
state adopts them); Nina Keilin, Note, Client Outreach 101: Solicitation of Elderly Clients
by Seminar Under Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1547, 1548
n.9 (1994) (clarifying that each state adopts its own standard of Model Rules).
40 People v. Herr, 86 N.Y.2d 638 (1995).
41 Herr, 86 N.Y.2d at 642 (quoting Niesig v. Team I, 76 N.Y.2d 363, 369-70 (1990));
see In re Estate of Weinstock, 40 N.Y.2d 1, 6 (1976) (explaining treatment of Model Rules
by courts); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 484-85 (1976) (noting that courts give Model
Rules of Professional Conduct great weight).
42 See Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Schs., 43 F.3d 1373, 1383 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating
adoption of Model Rules by federal court is matter of federal law); In re Dresser Indus.,
972 F.2d 540, 545 n.12 (5th Cir. 1992) (announcing that Texas law is inapplicable in
federal courts and adoption of Model Rules is for federal court to decide); In re American
Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that in federal court whether to
adopt Model Rules is a question of federal law).
43 Supra note 39 and accompanying text.
44 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1983) (amend. 1987); see Cole, 43 F.3d at
1383-84 (stating New Mexico's Rules of Professional Conduct and noting similarity with
ABA's Model Rules); Dresser, 972 F.2d at 545 n.7 (restating Rule 1.7 of Model Rules).
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2. Each client consents after consultation;
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by
the lawyer's own interest, unless:
1. the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will
not be adversely affected; and
2. the client consents to the consultation. When
representation of multiple clients in a single matter is
undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of
the implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved.
Clearly, the representation of two adverse parties is not
allowed under Model Rule 1.7. Comment two suggests that, if
such a conflict arises, an attorney should withdraw from the
representation. 45  Furthermore, Comment eleven suggests
relevant factors in determining whether there is a potential
adverse effect as a result of joint representation. 46 These factors
include: the length and quality of closeness of the relationship
between the attorney and client, the duties of the lawyer in the
representation, the possibility that conflict will arise and the
amount of prejudice to the client if the conflict does arise.47 In a
situation involving a premarital agreement, a lawyer should not,
under the Model Rules, represent both parties if their interests
45 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 2 (explaining when lawyer
should withdraw representation); see also Nancy J. Moore, What Doctors Can Lean from
Lawyers about Conflicts ofInterest, 81 B.U.L. REV. 445, 456 n.65 (2001) (explaining
lawyer should withdraw if conflicts arise); Susan Randall, Redefining the Insurer's Duty
to Defend, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 221, 236 n.44 (1996/1997) (stating that a lawyer should
immediately withdraw when consent is withheld from clients).
46 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 11 (describing situations in
which conflict may occur); see also Steven H. Hobbs, Family Matters: Nonwaivable
Conflicts of Interest in Family Law, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 57, 86 (1998) (quoting Model
Rule 1.7, Comment eleven standard); Peter Jarvis and Bradley F. Tellam, When Waiver
Should Not be Good Enough: An Analysis of Current Client Conflicts Law, 33
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 145, 154 (1997) (noting Model Rule 1.7 and comment eleven
standard).
47 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 11 (stating factors to consider in
order to determine if a conflict exists); see also Hobbs, supra note 46, at 86 (quoting Model
Rule 1.7, Comment 11); Gretchen L. Jankowski, The Ethics Involved in Representing
Multiple Parties in a Business Transaction: How to Avoid Being Caught Between Scylla
and Charybdis, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 179, 189 (1993) (quoting factors from Rule 1.7).
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are adverse; however, the decision whether the representation is
"directly adverse" to the parties is largely left up to the attorney's
"reasonable belief'.48 Although the Model Rules appear to give
much deference to the attorney's "reasonable belief," another
basic premise behind these rules in that a lawyer should avoid
the "appearance of impropriety."49
Other Ethncal Codes
Prior to the adoption of the Model Rules, the ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility also attempted to deal with joint-
representation and conflicts of interest in Ethical Consideration
5-15.50 Ethical Consideration 5-15 provides that before a lawyer
accepts multiple clients having "potentially different interests"
he or she must examine the possibility of divided loyalty or
impaired judgment.5 1 The Consideration further provides that a
lawyer should not accept the representation if there is any doubt
as to whether the lawyer may maintain his or her loyalty and
undivided judgment. 52 Furthermore, if the lawyer accepts the
48 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (giving lawyer ability to judge affects of
conflict); see Melissa M. Eckhuase, Note, A Chastity Belt for Lawyers: Proposed MRPC
1.8(k) and The Regulation ofAttorney Client Sexual Relationship, 75 U. DET. MERCY. L.
REV. 115, 136 (1997) (commenting that Model Rule 1.7's "adversely affect" standard is
based upon attorney's reasonableness); Burkhart R. Lindahl, Note, Ohio's New Ethical
Screening Procedure, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 145, 150 n.41 (1999) (noting that it is reasonable
belief of attorney whether client's interest are directly adverse).
49 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 9 (1983) (stating "A lawyer
should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.'); see also John D. Bessler,
The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV.
511, 549 (1994) (discussing that attorneys should avoid "the appearance of impropriety");
David A. Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional Television, and
Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice System, 35 ARIz. L. REV. 785, 791 (1993)
(stating lawyers should avoid the "appearance of impropriety").
50 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-15 (1980) (stating lawyer's
responsibility to consider if conflicting interests will hamper duties); see also Susan
Randell, Managing Litigation and the Professional Obligations Of Insurance Defense
Lawyers, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 33 n.107 (2001) (comparing EC 5-15 to MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY); Rapoport, supra note 31, at 944 (discussing fact that lawyer's
conflict must not interfere with client's needs).
51 See Lisa A. Dolak, Conflicts of Interest: Guidance for the Intellectual Property
Practitioner, 39 J.L. & TECH. 267, 271 n.19 (1999) (noting that EC 5-15 requires attorneys
to weigh possibility of impaired loyalty or judgment if he or she continues or accepts
employment of multiple clients); John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The
Representation of Multiple Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV.
741, 760 (quoting EC 5-15); Thomas D. Morgan, SuingA Current Client, 1 J. INT. STUD.
LEG. ETH. 87, 98 n.38 (1996) (quoting EC 5-15).
52 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-15 (discussing need for lawyer to
alleviate all questionable scenarios before accepting employment); see also Eugene R.
Gaetke & Robert G. Schwemm, Government Lawyers and Their Private "Clients" Under
Fair Housing Act, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329, 369 n.246 (1997) (quoting EC 5-15); David
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multiple representation and there is a conflict of interest the
lawyer should withdraw.5 3 Since the withdrawal by the attorney
might adversely affect the client, EC-5-15 suggests that the
lawyer never accept the employment in the first place. 54
Ethical Consideration 5-16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility further attempts to deal with concerns associated
with joint representation.5 5 This Consideration promulgates that
before an attorney may represent clients with "differing
interests, it is nevertheless essential that each client be given the
opportunity to evaluate his need for the representation free of
any potential conflict and to obtain other counsel if he so
desires."56 Also, EC 5-16 states that before the lawyer can
represent multiple clients he or she should "explain fully to each
client the implications of the common representation and should
accept or continue employment only if the clients consent."5 7
I. Gold, Article, I Know You're the Government's Lawyer, but You Are My Lawyer Too?
An Exploration of the Federal-Native American Trust Relationshyxo Conflicts of Interest,
19 BUFF. PUB. INTEREST L.J. 1, 14 n.67 (2000/2001) (quoting EC 5-15); Rapoport, supra
note 31, at 955 n.156 (quoting EC 5-15).
53 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-15 (stating need to end
employment if conflict does arise); see also Gaetke & Schwemm, supra note 52, at 369
n.246 (quoting EC 5-15); Gold, supra note 52, at 14 n.67 (quoting EC 5-15); Rapoport,
supra note 31, at 955 n.156 (quoting EC 5-15).
54 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-15 states:
If a lawyer is requested to undertake or to continue representation of multiple
clients having potentially differing interests, he must weigh carefully the
possibility that his judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided.. If a lawyer
accepted such employment and the interests did become actually differing he would
have to withdraw from employment with likelihood of resulting hardship on the
clients; and for this reason it is preferable that he refuse the employment
initially.")
See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-15; see also Gaetke & Schwemm,
supra note 52, at 369 n.246 (quoting EC 5-15); Gold, supra note 52, at 14 n.67 (quoting
EC 5-15); Rapoport, supra note 31, at 955 n.156 (quoting EC 5-15).
55 See Dolak, supra note 51, at 271 n.19 (explaining EC 5-16 involves multiple
representations); Lori Gallagher & Andrew S. Hanen, Attorney Client Conflicts of
Interest and Disqualification in Texas Litigation, 24 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1039, 1047 (1993)
(commenting that EC 5-16 involves multiple representation); Robert B. Gilbreath, Caught
in a Crossfire Preventing and Handling Conflict of Interest Guidelines for Texas
Insurance Defense Counsel, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 139, 150 (1996) (discussing EC 5-16
involves discussion of multiple representation).
56 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-16 (1980) (granting client voice in
representation conflicts by requiring attorney disclosure) see Bruce A. Green, "Through A
Glass, Darkly" How the Court Sees Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1214 n.61 (1989) (discussing need of attorney to disclose conflict
under EC 5-16). See generally Employers Casualty Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.
1973) (mentioning EC 5-16 in application of duty).
57 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-16 (leaving final determination of
representation to client); see Dolak, supra note 51, at 289 (stating attorney may need to
obtain client consent before proceeding if conflict exists); Hobbs, supra note 46, at 66
(noting client may agree to continue after informed of conflict).
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Generally, ethical rules prohibit attorneys from joint-
representation of clients where there is adverse interest.5 8
Independent counsel is routinely recommended by the courts
when drafting a prenuptial agreement because the parties'
interests are often adverse.59
The concerns regarding joint representation are further
addressed in the disciplinary rules of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. DR 5-105(a) provides that a lawyer
"shall decline proffered employment... if it would be likely to
involve him in representing differing interests."60 However, an
exception is provided in DR 5-105 (c) whereby, "a lawyer may
represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately
represent the interests and if each consents to the representation
after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation
on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on
behalf of each."61
Many states have adopted some form of a Model Rule or a Code
of Professional Responsibility. Each state attempts to deal with
58 See Nora J. Pasman, The Conflict of "Conflict of Interest" The Michigan Example,
1995 DET. C.L. REV. 133, 165 (1995) (noting attorney representing clients with adverse
interest is ethically prohibited); Rapoport, supra note 31, at 952 (stating representing
multiple clients with adverse interests is not allowed); Joseph A. Rosenberg, Adapting
Unitary Principles of Professional Responsibility to Unique Practice Contexts A
Reflective Model for Resolving Ethical Dilemmas in Elder Law, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 403,
455 (2000) (discussing prohibition of multiple representation of adverse clients by single
attorney).
59 See In re Marriage of Leathers, 309 Ore. 625, 631 (1990) (stating absent full
disclosure joint-representation of adverse parties is prohibited); see also Leah
Guggenheimer, A Modest Proposal: The Feminomics of Drafting Premarital Agreements,
17 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 147, 196 (1996) (noting there are adverse parties to
prenuptial agreements). See generally Michael Cohen, Trying Second Marriage?
Prenuptial is Crucial, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 20, 2000, at G7 (discussing that parties to
prenuptial agreement are opposing each other).
60 NEW YORK CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-105(a) (1998) (amended 1999)
(requiring attorney to refuse to represent client if conflicting interests are present); see
John D. Ayer et al., Ethics: Is Disinterestedness Still a Viable Option? A Discussion, 5
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 201, 232 n.112 (1997) (quoting DR 5-105); Theresa M. Mady,
Surrogate Mothers: The Legal Issues, 7 AM. J. L. & MED. 323, 341 n.95 (1981) (observing
that DR 5-105 restricts representation).
61 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT, DR 5-105 (c) (1998) (amended 1999) (outlining in
DR 5-105 when lawyer should remove himself because of conflict of interest, if her
"independent professional judgment" may be "adversely affected"); see, Marshall J.
Breger, Disqualiication for Conflicts of Interest and the Legal Aid Attorney, 62 B.U.L.
REV. 1115, 1120-1 (indicating lawyer's interest has been overvalued, especially with
respect to informed consent doctrine, and further that client's interests should be
controlling, because protection of the client is primary consideration); Douglas R.
Richmond, Accommodation Clients, 35 AKRON L. REV. 59, 64 (2001) (concluding language
of DR 5-105, creates balancing of lawyer's interest and presumptively opposes dual
representation).
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conflicts of interest in representing adverse clients. New York
State, in DR 5-105, deals with a lawyer's possible conflict of
interest in much the same way as the Model Code, but also
encompasses some language from the ABA Model Rule 1.7 and
its comments. Section 1200.24 of the New York Code of
Professional Responsibility, more commonly referred to as DR 5-
105, deals with the conflict of interest caused by concurrent
representation. 62 New York's DR 5-105 provides that a lawyer
shall not represent multiple clients if the lawyer's decision
making for that client would be negatively impacted by the
representation of another client.63 New York, like the Model
Code, provides an exception within the rule itself. A lawyer,
under DR 5-105 (c), would be allowed to represent both clients, if
a "disinterested lawyer" would after full disclosure to the clients
"competently represent the interests of each."64  This
"disinterested lawyer" standard is different from the standard in
the Model Code because in the Model Code the decision was left
up to the lawyer's personal judgment.65 Here it appears that the
lawyer involved would have to be more objective by trying to view
the situation as if she or he was disinterested in the situation.
Perhaps one of the more strict requirements on simultaneous
representation arises from Alaska. Rule 1.7(a), which clearly
restricts an attorney from accepting adverse representation "in
62 See Paula Galowitz, Collaboration Between Lawyers and Social Workers:
Reexamining the Nature and Potential of the Relationship, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2123,
2142 n.87 (1999) (noting NY's DR 5-105 speaks to conflicts of interest); Ze'-ev Eigerand
and Brandy Rutan, Conflicts of Interest: Attorneys Representing Parties with Adverse
Interests in the Same Commercial Transaction, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 945, 951 (2001)
(discussing NY's DR 5-105 with regard to conflicts of interest); Abraham C. Reich, Scott L.
Vernick & Joshua Horn, Post-Conference Reflections Screening Mechanism: A Broader
Application? Balancing Economic Realities and Ethical Obligations, 72 TEMPLE L. REV.
1023, 1025 (1999) (stating NY's DR 5-105 involves conflicts of interest)..
63 See 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 1200.24, (1998) (amended 1999) (stating: "A
lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of independent professional
judgment in behalf of the client will be or is likely to be adversely affected"); see also
Patrick M. Conmors, Professional Responsibility, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 827, 857-58 (noting
representation of multiple clients is permissible if "disinterested lawyer" could view
representation as competent). See generally Vincent M. Bonventre, Professional
Responsibility, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 765, 780 n.106 (1995) (discussing case that violated
DR 5-105 when conflict of interest existed by representing multiple clients).
64 22 N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. 1200.24 (differing from the Model Rules, by
introduction of explicitly objective standard); see Dzienkowski, supra note 51, at 760
(contending drafters of the Model Rules intended to encourage more objective standard);
Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees without Contingencies: Hamlet without the Prince of
Denmark, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, n.88 (1989) (claiming objective standard is implicit in DR
5-105).
65 Supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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the same or substantially related matters."66 The comment to
this rule suggests that a conflict of interest due to simultaneous
representation may result in a delay in the case, and because of
the possibility of delay an attorney should use "due diligence" to
"take all reasonable measures to determine whether or not a
conflict of interest exists. .."67
It is clear that the topic of simultaneous representation of
adverse parties and the representation of multiple clients is an
issue prevalent in many ethical codes. An attorney representing
both parties to a prenuptial agreement faces a significant ethical
dilemma. This multiple representation may become a conflict of
adverse interests. Due to the nature of the relationship between
the parties involved in a premarital agreement, there may be
certain situations in which independent counsel may be
especially important such as when one of the future spouses is
considerably more wealthy than the other, or when only one
spouse waives his or her rights to an elective share.68 Another
example is when one spouse has a preexisting relationship with
the attorney proposed to represent both parties in the drafting of
a premarital agreement. 69
66 ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1998) (establishing restrictions on
conflict of interest doctrine); see Steven Kalish, An Instrumental Interpretation of Model
Rule 1. 7 (A) in the Corporate Family Situation: Unintended Consequences in Pandora's
Box, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 37, 70 (1998) (describing Alaska rule as simultaneous conflict
of interest as opposed to prior clients); MacPherson et. al., Recent Developments in the
Law of Conflicts of Interest: Guidelines for the Intellectual Property Lawyer, 671 PRAC.
INST. L. R. 569, 576 (2001) (indicating imposition of reasonable diligence standard for
determining conflict of interest).
67 ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. (establishing stringent due
diligence standard); see, MacPherson, supra note 66, at 576 (identifying reasonable
diligence standard under Alaska Rule 1.7 in determining conflict of interest); see also,
Peter B. Brautigam, Ethical Issues in Estate Planning, A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUC., August 23, 1996 at 512 (indicating importance of disclosure to the clients at early
stage of proceedings).
68 See generally, John M. Burman, Lawyers and Domestic Violence: Part I, 24 WYO.
LAWYER 37, 38-39 (2001) (discussing conflict of interest and need for independent counsel
domestic violence situations); Judith T. Younger, Antenuptial Agreements, 28 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 697, 718 (2001) (indicating presumption of informed consent despite
not having independent counsel, assuming there is clear language to explaining the
significance of possible adverse consequences of prenuptial agreement); John G. Gherini,
Note, The California Supreme Court Swings and Misses in Defining the Scope and
Enforceability of Premarital Agreements, 36 U.S.F.L. REV., 151, 163-64 (2001) (examining
California's decision that lack of independent counsel is an important factor in
determining enforceability of prenuptial agreement).
69 See generally, Wolford v. Wolford, 785 P.2d 625 (Idaho 1991) (holding prenuptial
agreement drafted without independent counsel, was enforceable when there was
subsequent contact with independent counsel, prior to signing of agreement); Gant v.
Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 116 (W.Va. 1985) (stating advice of independent counsel is not
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Attorney-Client Relationship
Before the discussion of when and how an attorney may
ethically represent both parties to a prenuptial agreement, it
might be beneficial to explain when and how an attorney-client
relationship is formed. Whether an attorney-client relationship
exists is a question of fact.7 0 An attorney-client relationship does
not need to be reduced to writing or formally drafted, although it
may be. 71 Payment is not crucial in forming an attorney client
relationship.72 The attorney-client relationship, however, can be
sufficiently formed through more informal means, such as
through the party's conduct.73 When deciding if an attorney-
client relationship has been formed, courts will often look at
"reasonable belief' of the client as to whether he or she
reasonably believed that an attorney represented her.7 4 Often the
required, (so long as independent counsel could have been obtained) however it is
permissible to show absence of fraud or duress); Marston, supra note 6, at 914 (advocating
requirement of consultation with independent counsel as prerequisite for enforceability of
prenuptial agreement).
70 See Bohn v. Cody, 832 P.2d 71, 74 (Wash. 1992) (stating that attorney-client
relationship is question of fact); 48 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 525 (1987) (establishing
criteria for determining existence of attorney-client relationship at given point in time for
variety of purposes); R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 11.2 n.12 (3d ed.
1989) (claiming attorney-client relationship is factual determination).
71 See Edward C. Brewer, III, The Ethics of Internal Investigation in Kentucky and
Ohio, 27 N. Ky. L. REV. 721, 739 (2000) (discussing that no formal agreement is needed to
form attorney-client relationship); Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in
Cyberspace: The Peril and the Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147, 161 (1999) (clarifying that
attorney-client relationship may form without formal agreement); David N. May, Note,
Inhouse Defenders of Insureds: Some Ethical Considerations, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 881, 907-
08 (1998) (noting attorney-client relationship is contractual and does not require
formalism).
72 See David B. Canning, Comment, Privileged Communications in Ohio and What's
New on the Horizon, Ohio House Bill 52 Accountant-Chent Privilege, 31 AKRON L. REV.
505, 516 n.38 (1998) (specifying that payment is of fees is not crucial for formation of
attorney-client relationship); Gregory Huffman, Comment, Creating the Legal Monster.
The Expansion and Effect of Legal Malpractice Liability in North Carolina, 18 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 121, 133 n.94 (1996) (noting attorney-client relationship can be formed with
payment of fee); William Andy Jones, When Are the Corporation's Partner's Also a
Client, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 453, 457 (1999/2000) (explaining that fee is not needed to form
attorney-client relationship).
73 See David Beck, Legal Malpractice in Texas: Second Edition, 50 BAYLOR L. REV.
551, 532 (1998) (stating that attorney-client relationship can be formed by parties
conducts); Marshall, supra note 25, at 182 (explaining that court looks to parties conduct
to see if attorney-client relationship formed); May, supra note 71, at 907 (noting that
attorney-client relationship may be inferred by parties conduct).
74 See Lanctot, supra note 71, at 183 n.16 (stating "reasonable belief' of parties is
important factor in determining whether attorney-client relationship existed); Randall
Roth, Understanding the Attorney-Client and Trustee- Beneficiary Relationshps in the
Kamehamera Schools Bishop Estate Litigation: A Reply to Professor McCall, 21 HAWAII
L. REV. 511, 516 n.19 (1999) (explaining that existence of attorney-client relationship is
based on "reasonable belief" of client); John Casey Pipes, Comment, The Implied
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issue of whether or not an attorney-client relationship is formed
in a prenuptial agreement is very complex. As stated earlier,
because the nature of the relationship between the engaged
couple is different from many other arm's-length contracts, the
parties have to act in a fiduciary matter.75 Often one party may
have representation and the other party may not. Although this
does not appear to present a problem on its face, the problem
arises because the unrepresented party may believe that the
attorney is an expert in the law and not interested in either party
or that the attorney is representing his or her interests as well. 76
Perhaps the best advice an attorney can give to an unrepresented
party is to seek representation. 77
REPRESENTATION AND THE UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT
ACT
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws promulgates the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act
(UPAA) in 1983.78 Since that time it has been adopted in more
Professional Relationship: An Extension of the Attorneys Duties and Obligations, 20 J.
LEGAL PROF. 319, 324 n.21 (1995/1996) (commenting that attorney-client relationship can
be formed based on "reasonable belief' of client).
75 See In re Marriage of Leathers, 789 P.2d 263, 265 (Or. 1990) (commenting that
nature of relationship between parties "imposes fiduciary duties in transactions between
them"); see also In re Estate of Benker, 331 N.W. 2d 193, 196 (Mich. 1982) (discussing
relationship of parties to prenuptial agreement is of "extreme mutual confidence"); Del
Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17, 21 (Fla. 1962) (stating relationship between parties
to prenuptial agreement is of trust).
76 See, e.g., Tenneboe v. Tenneboe, 558 So.2d 470, 474 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(explaining that unrepresented party may believe attorney is disinterested in parties);
Demaggio v. Demaggio, 317 So.2d 848, 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (explaining that
husband thought attorney represented both parties to his prenuptial agreement). See
generally Michael Kevin Abernathy, Client or Adverse Party - Who Shall an Attorney
Represent?" Duties Toward and Unrepresented Party in Transactions, 19 J. LEGAL PROF.
337, 338 (1995) (explaining Model Rules of Professional Conduct require attorneys to
rectify situation upon realizing that unrepresented party misunderstands attorney's role
in proceeding).
77 See In re Marriage of Foran, 57 Wash. App. 242, 254 (1992) (holding that attorney
should advise unrepresented party as to why it is important that he or she obtain advice
from independent counsel); Abernathy, supra note 76, at 343 (commenting it is "very good
practice to advise an unrepresented party to seek independent counsel. . ."); William J.
Hazzard, Professional Responsibility: Duties Owed to an Unrepresented Party, 44 FLA. L.
REV. 489, 497 (1992) (noting that comment to Rule 4-4.3 of Model Rules of Professional
Conduct advises attorney to not give legal advice to unrepresented party beyond advice to
seek independent counsel).
78 See Elizabeth Barker Brandt, The Uniform Premarital Agreements Act and the
Reality of PremaritalAgreements in Idaho, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 539, 544 n.26 (1997) (noting
UPAA was promulgated in 1983); DiFonzo, supra note 21, at 939 (explaining UPAA was
created in 1983); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93
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than half of the states. 79 The purpose is to create "uniform
legislation conforming to modern social policy which provides
both certainty and sufficient flexibility to accommodate different
circumstances ... " 80
The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act creates a presumption
that premarital agreements are valid and enforceable,8 and the
party seeking to void the agreement has the burden of proving
the contrary.8 2  Even absent consideration, a prenuptial
agreement under the UPAA is valid if it is in writing and signed
by both parties. 83 Comment two, of Section two of the UPAA
Nw. U.L. REV. 65, 76 (1998) (stating UPAA was promulgated in 1983).
79 See Margaret F. Brinig, Commentary: Feminism and Child Custody under Chapter
Two of the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 301, 301 n.3 (2001) (stating UPAA has been adopted in twenty five
states and District of Columbia); Marston, supra note 6, at 889 (explaining UPAA has
been adopted in more than half of states); Jennifer M. Stolier, Comment, Disputing
Frozen Embryos: Using International Perspectives to Formulate Uniform US Policy, 9
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 459, 474 (2001) (explaining that UPAA has been adopted in more
than half of states).
80 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act, Prefatory Note 1 (1983), at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulclfnact99/1980s/upaa83.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2003)
(stating Act will relieve past "spasmodic, reflexive response[s]" to various situations and
circumstances); see Hall v. Hall, 222 Cal. App. 3d 578, 583 (Cal Ct. App. 1990) (noting
that general purpose of Act is to create uniformity in law related to premarital
agreements among states adopting Act); Jane Aune Deach, Case Comment, Premarital
Settlements: Till Death Do Us Part - Defining the Enforceability of the Uniform
Premartal Agreement Act in North Dakota In re Estate of Lutz, 563 N W2d 90 (ND.
1997), 74 N. DAK. L. REv. 411, 417 (1998) (stating purpose of Act is to provide "model
statute governing premarital agreements that offer states uniformity regarding the
enforceability of premarital agreements."). See generally Graham, supra note 3, at 1050
(discussing motivation behind UPAA, as well as commenting that older rules regarding
premarital agreements may have lost force and are being replaced by "modem social
policy.").
81 See Schwarz v. Schwarz, No. 01-99-01365-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 7828, 5 (Tex.
App., 2000) (observing that UPAA creates rebuttable presumption that premarital
agreement is valid); Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of
Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM & MARY L. REV. 145,
160 (1998) thereinafter Bix, Bargainingi (noting under UPAA there is presumption of
enforceability); Silbaugh, supra note 78, at 79 n.53 (stating presumption of enforceability
in prenuptial agreements in UPAA).
82 See Brandt, supra note 78, at 544 (noting party challenging prenuptial agreement
has burden of proof); Mary McKelvey, In re Marriage of Bonds: California Supreme Court:
Decided. August 21, 2000: 7-0, 30 SW. U.L. REV. 657, 661 (2001) (stating that challenging
party bears burden of proof); David Westfall, Unmarried Partners and the Legacy of
Marvin v. Marvin: Forcing Incidents of Marriage on Unmarred Cohabitants: The
American Law Institute's Principles of Family Dissolution, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467,
1483 (2001) (explaining burden of proof lies with challenger).
83 See Jennifer Kim, Part 3: Getting Married: Contesting the Enforceability of a
Premarital Agreement, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 133, 134 n.10 (2000) (explaining
prenuptial agreement is valid absent consideration as long as signed and in writing);
Robert H. Martin, Waivers of Spousal Support in Premarital Agreements, 1 SAN DIEGO
JUSTICE J. 475, 478 (1993) (noting prenuptial agreements that are signed and in writing
are valid without consideration). See generally, Shukhman, supra note 6 (noting written
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states, "what appears to be the almost universal rule regarding
the marriage as consideration for a premarital agreement."84 In
order to find a prenuptial agreement invalid the party
challenging it must prove that the agreement was
unconscionable and there must have been nondisclosure.8 5
Perhaps the most relevant section in our discussion is Section
6 discussing enforcement. Section 6 provides the following:
(a) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party
against whom enforcement is sought proves that:
1. that party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or
2. the agreement was unconscionable when it was
executed and, before execution of the agreement, that
party
i. was not provided fair and reasonable disclosure of the
property or financial obligations of the other party;
ii. did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing,
any right to disclosure of the property or financial
obligation of the other party beyond the disclosure
provided; and
iii. did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an
adequate knowledge of the property or financial
obligations of the other party ...
(c) An issue of unconscionability of a premarital agreement
signed prenuptial agreement is valid absent consideration).
84 UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 2, cmt. (1983); see Brett A. Barfield,
Comment, Are Same Sex Prenuptial Agreements Enforceable in Florida? Posik v. Layton,
Law & Policy, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 407, 424 (1998) (discussing marriage as
consideration); Katc and Clayman, supra note 24, at 446-47 (explaining marriage can
serve as form of consideration); Allison J. Chen & Jonathan A. Sambur, Note, Are
Consensual Relationship Agreements a Solution to Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 165, 193 (1994) (indicating that the marriage
itself serves as the requisite consideration necessary in a prenuptial agreement).
85 See Bix, Bargaining, supra note 81, at 155 (noting under UPAA, prenuptial
agreement is invalid if there is non-disclosure and unconscionability); Bix, Premarital
Agreements, supra note 5, at 234 n.15 (explaining prenuptial agreement is invalid if
unconscionable and there is non-disclosure); Brandt, supra note 78, at 565 (discussing
premarital agreement is invalid if there is non-disclosure).
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shall be decided by the court as a matter of law. 86
The comments to this section help to explain its significance.
The enforcement of a prenuptial agreement, under the Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act, depends upon whether the agreement
was unconscionable at the time of execution.87 Whether or not a
prenuptial agreement is "unconscionable" is a matter of law to be
decided by the court.88 Unconscionability is meant to encompass
the commercial law definition,8 9 which includes "protection
against one-sidedness, oppression, or unfair surprise."90 The
Comments further suggest that, in determining
unconscionability, the court may look at "any relevant evidence
such as the conditions under which the agreement was made,
including knowledge of the parties."91 However, all courts are not
in agreement. The lack of independent counsel is not a
86 Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, § 6; see Brandt, supra note 78, at 541 (opining
that section 6 of UPAA is "the key provision."); Graham, supra note 3, at 1051 (stating
that Section 6, which outlines requirements for enforceability of premarital agreements,
is often referred to as "heart" of UPAA).
87 See Bix, Bargaining, supra note 81, at 155 (explaining enforceability of prenuptial
agreement depends upon whether unconscionable at time of execution); Deach, supra note
80, at 416 (1997) (stating courts examine whether agreement was fair at time it was
made, not at time of judgment); Charlotte K. Goldberg, "If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It"
Premarital Agreements and Spousal Support Waivers in California, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1245, 1248 (2000) (noting enforceability of prenuptial depends upon whether agreement
was unconscionable at time of execution).
88 See UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, cmt. 5; Fazakerly v. Fazakerly, 996
S.W.2d 260, 265 (Tex. App. 1999) (holding that when attempting to invalidate antenuptial
agreement, court must decide issue of unconscionability as matter of law before
addressing disclosure questions); see also Ronald J. Resmini, The Law of Domestic
Relations in Rhode Island, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 392-93 (1995) (commenting that in
Rhode Island, family court decides issues relating to unconscionability of prenuptial
agreements as matter of law).
89 UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, cmt. 4. Compare Marsh v. Marsh, 949
S.W.2d 734, 739-40 (finding "iln the absence of clear guidance as to the definition of
"unconscionability" in marital property cases, courts have turned to the commercial
context.") with Dematteo v. Dematteo, 436 Mass. 18, 33 (2002) (finding it inappropriate to
use unconscionability as standard for antenuptial agreement and resorting to a "fair and
reasonable" test for testing validity of prenuptial agreement).
90 UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, cmt. 4; see In re Marriage of Riedy, 130
Ill. App. 3d 311, 317 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (commenting that "[an unconscionable bargain is
one which no man in his senses, not under delusion, would make, on the one hand, and
which no fair and honest man would accept on the other."); Robert S. Adler and Richard
A. Mann, Good Faith: A New Look at an Old Doctrine, 28 AKRON L. REV. 31, 41 (Summer
1994) (stating "[tihe doctrine of unconscionability attempts to prevent oppression and
unfair surprise, but not to relieve a party from a bad bargain).
91 UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, cmt. 5 (1983); see, e.g., Adler and
Mann, supra note 90, at 40-41 (explaining that circumstances existing at time of contract
formation can be used to determine unconscionability); Goldberg, supra note 87, at 1264
(stating that in determining unconscionability, investigations could lead back to pre-
marital knowledge or expectations of finances or property).
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"condition for the unenforceability of premarital agreement,"92
although it may be a "factor in determining whether the
conditions stated in Section 6 may have existed." 93
Although there is no "absolute requirement" of independent
counsel under the UPAA, some courts have held that, where an
agreement is "patently unreasonable," independent counsel is
required to have the agreement be enforceable. 94 Although other
non-UPAA courts hold to the contrary, under the Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act there is a presumption of validity and
enforceability, a carte blanche requirement of independent
counsel would be "arbitrary and unnecessary."95 The idea behind
this notion of not requiring independent counsel in a prenuptial
agreement is that individuals should be allowed to order their
own affairs.96
However, since there is a fiduciary relationship between the
parties, each party must exercise the "highest degree of good
faith, candor and sincerity in all matters bearing on the proposed
agreement."97
92 UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, cmt. 6 (1983); see McKee-Johnson v.
Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 266 (Minn. 1989) (noting that wife's opportunity to consult with
independent counsel would be factored into court's enforcement of premarital agreement).
But see Deach, supra note 80, at 431 (stating that North Dakota Supreme Court used lack
of independent counsel in determining enforceability of agreement).
93 UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, cmt. 6 (1983); see In re Estate
Crawford, 107 Wash.2d 493, 496 (1986) (holding independent counsel was used to
determine existence of voluntariness and other Section 6 factors); Deach, supra note 80,
at 431 (noting that it may be used in determining whether voluntariness existed).
94 See e.g., Foran v. Foran, 67 Wash. App. 242, 256 (1992) (explaining that when
agreement is "patently unreasonable" independent counsel is required); Crawford, 107
Wash.2d at 496-97 (noting that there is no requirement for independent counsel); see also
Gherini, supra note 68, at 166 (commenting that UPAA should but does not require
independent counsel for both parties).
95 Crawford, 107 Wash.2d at 497 (noting existence of arbitrariness especially when
"strong independent mind," free from "objectionable influence" is established); see
Whitney v. Seattle First National Bank, 90 Wash.2d 105, 109 (1978) (holding that
independent counsel was unnecessary due to fair, reasonable nature of agreement);
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 68 Ohio St. 3d 464, 473 (1994) (Resnick, J., dissenting) (arguing that
agreements should be unenforceable unless forfeiting party is represented by independent
counsel).
96 See Bix, Bargaining, supra note 81, at 146 (1998) (commenting that individuals
should be allowed to order their own affairs); Silbaugh, supra note 78, at 136
(acknowledging courts in favoring individual's ordering their own affairs); Fraatz, supra
note 4, at 459 (noting ability to order own affairs is "essential" for stability).
97 Crawford, 107 Wash.2d at 497 (explaining that parties to prenuptials do not deal at
arm's length, rather their relationship is one of mutual trust and confidence); see Hamlin
v. Merlino, 44 Wash.2d 851, 864 (1954) (noting strict requirements of good faith imposed
upon intended husband). But see, Adler and Mann, supra note 90, at 41-42 (recognizing
obligation of good faith in arm's length contracts as well).
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JOINT REPRESENTATION AND THE COMMON LAW
Although the UPAA has been adopted in the majority of states,
there are still states that chose to follow the common law. 98 As
indicated above, prenuptial agreements are no longer considered
void as against public policy.99 Today, courts not only recognize
premarital agreements as valid, but even find them favored in
public policy. Accordingly, courts have set forth requirements for
valid prenuptial agreements.100 Although the requirements for a
valid prenuptial agreement may vary according to jurisdiction
there are three common criteria. 101 The first criterion asks
whether the agreement was created as a result of "fraud, duress
or mistake, or misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material
fact."102 The second criterion is whether the agreement was
unconscionable when executed and the third is whether the
situation has changed since the agreement was made making its
enforcement "unfair and unreasonable.' 03 If none of the three
questions is answered in the affirmative then the court generally
98 See Atwood, supra note 15, at 136 (stating that states that followed common law
had little guidance in prenuptial agreements); Homer H. Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, 50
COLO. L. REV. 141, 148 (1979) (noting that many states continue to rely on common law);
Shukhman, supra note 6, at 463-64 (clarifying requirements that common law states use
in prenuptial agreements).
99 See Button v. Button, 388 NW 2d 546, 548 (Wis. 1986) (explaining useful financial
function of premarital agreements in helping people achieve expectations, as well as
financial certainty); TJAGSA Practice Note: Legal Assistance Items, 1992 ARMY LAW. 43
(noting historical contempt for premarital agreements has been discarded). See generally
Davis, supra note 17, (indicating significant judicial recognition of premarital agreements
through rulings that make these agreements binding on creditors).
100 See Bix, Premarital Agreements, supra note 5, at 234 (explaining existence of
procedural rights as well, such as need to be in writing); Featherson and Douthitt,
Changing the Rules by Agreement. The New Era in Characterization, Management and
Liability of Marital Property, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 271, 298-99 (Spring 1997) (noting that
Texas statute affects prenuptial requirements); Faun M. Phillipson, Fairness of Contract
v. Freedom of Contract: The Problematic Nature of Contract Obligation in Pre-Marital
Agreements, 5 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L. J. 79, 98 (stating requirements exist for contractual
fairness purposes).
101 See Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1049 (Alaska 1987) (noting three common
criteria considered in questioning validity of prenuptial agreement); Gant v. Gant, 329
S.E. 2d 106, 112 (W. Va. 1985) (explaining that three criteria are considered in light of
public policy recognizing rapid growth in divorce rate); Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635,
641 (Ga. 1982) (holding that Trial Judge has discretion in determining three criteria).
102 Brooks 733 P.2d at 1049. See Posner v. Posner, 257 So. 2d 530, 534 (Fla. 1972)
(holding prenuptial invalid due to nondisclosure); Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d
17, 20 (Fla. 1962) (explaining that prior to three criteria wife will be bound even though
husband failed to disclose).
103 See Brooks, 733 P.2d at 1049; Allen v. Allen, 400 S.E.2d. 15, 16 (Ga. 1991) (using
same three criteria for determining validity of marriage agreement); Gentry v. Gentry,
798 S.W.2d. 928 (Ky. 1990) (applying same three criteria to antenuptial agreement).
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recognizes the agreement. 104 A valid prenuptial agreement must
be "fair, equitable and reasonable in view of the surrounding
circumstances.",0 5 "It must be entered into voluntarily by both
parties, with each understanding his or her rights and the extent
of the waiver of such rights."06
Perhaps the clearest test is a two-prong test. The first prong of
analysis is whether the prenuptial agreement "provides fair and
reasonable provisions for the party not seeking enforcement of
the agreement."10 7 If the court decides it does then the agreement
is valid; if it does not then the court will move to the second-
prong of analysis. 108  The second-prong asks two distinct
questions. The first question is whether there was full disclosure
by the parties in which they disclosed "the amount, character,
and value of the property involved."109 The second question
involves whether the parties entered into the agreement, "fully
104 Brooks, 733 P.2d. at 1049 (explaining if none of three criteria are met prenuptial
agreements are generally recognized); see In re Marriage of Pendleton & Fireman, 5 P.3d.
839, 845-46 (Cal. 2000) (stating demographic trends of state courts in allowing waiver of
spousal support through prenuptial agreements). See generally Ex parte Walters, 580
So.2d 1352, 1354 (Ala., 2000) (stating that prenuptial agreements are generally
enforceable if certain standards of fairness, free will, and knowledge are satisfied).
105 In reEstate of Benker, 331 N.W.2d 193, 196 (Mich. 1982). See generallySnedaker
v. Snedaker, 660 So.2d 1070, 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (requiring prenuptial
agreement be fair and reasonable); Frey v. Frey, 471 A.2d 705, 711 (Md. 1984) (stating
antenuptial agreement is enforceable if it is fair and equitable in procurement and result).
106 Benker, 331 N.W.2d at 196; see Brooks, 733 P.2d at 1049 (stating that one factor
that can invalidate otherwise valid prenuptial agreement is if one party did not
voluntarily waive his or her rights, or could not have had knowledge of the waiver of his
or her rights); In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 822-23 (Cal. 2000) (stating that
prenuptial agreement is valid only if party did not voluntarily waive rights to property, or
could not have reasonably have had knowledge of the other parties property or finances).
107 In reMarriage of Matson, 730 P.2d 668, 670 (Wash. 1986) (cited in Foran v. Foran,
834 P.2d 1081, 1085 (1992)). See generally Rolfe v. Rolfe, 130 A. 877, 878 (Me. 1925)
(stating that gross disproportionality in provision for spouse may invalidate the
antenuptial agreement); Sogg v. Nevada State Bank, 832 P.2d 781, 784 (Nev. 1992)
(stating that some jurisdictions presume fraud where the agreement greatly disfavors the
party not seeking enforcement).
108 Matson, 730 P.2d at 670; see, e.g., In re Estate of Crawford 730 P.2d 675, 678
(Wash. 1986) (holding prenuptial agreement unfair based on same prongs in Matson
because no provisions were made for spouse in event of divorce or death); In re Marriage
of Fox, 795 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (outlining two pronged test set out in
Matson, including first consideration of whether there were fair and reasonable provisions
provided in the agreement).
109 Matson, 730 P.2d at 670. See generally Conley, supra note 18, at 1024-25
(explaining that most jurisdictions require disclosure of nature and extent of assets for
antenuptial agreements to be valid); David Westfall, Unmarried Partners and the Legacy
of Marvin v. Marvin: Forcing Incidents of Marriage on Unmarried Cohabitants: The
American Law Institutes Principles of Family Dissolution, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467,
1484-90 (2002) (discussing ALI's requirements of disclosure of assets and income for
purposes of premarital agreements).
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and voluntarily on independent advice and with full knowledge
by [both spouses of their] rights."1 0 The common law in its two-
prong analysis differs from the UPAA. The UPAA only questions
whether there is "fair and reasonable disclosure," not specific,
detailed disclosure. 11'
The question of full and fair disclosure is discussed in many
cases. Full and fair disclosure is commonly required in
prenuptial agreements; however, full disclosure does not
necessarily mean disclosure of each asset owned.112 Full and fair
disclosure requires that each party to the premarital contract "be
given a clear idea of the nature, extent and value" of the other
parties' assets.113 Even absent full and fair disclosure, an
antenuptial agreement may still be valid if the spouse seeking to
void the agreement had "independent knowledge" of the "full
nature, extent, and value or the other spouses' property and
holdings."114 Whether full and fair disclosure was given or is
110 Matson, 730 P.2d at 670. See generally In reMarriage of Norris, 624 P.2d 636, 640
(Or. Ct. App. 1981) (holding invalid a prenuptial agreement where wife did not have
knowledge of husband's property, and did not have time to retain advice of counsel
independently); Bauer v. Bauer, 464 P.2d 710, 711 (Or. Ct. App. 1970) (holding agreement
unenforceable when husband presented it on day parties left town to get married and
failed to disclose his assets and allow sufficient time for wife to consult lawyer
independently).
I' See Bix, Bargaining, supra note 81, at 145, n.36 (quoting UPAA requirement that
there be fair and reasonable disclosure to both parties). See generally Brandt, supra note
78, at 565 (stating that although detailed disclosure is best, disclosure is not mandatory
in all circumstances under UPAA); Shukhman, supra note 6, at n.73 (stating UPAA
requirements for enforcement of prenuptial agreements, including "fair and reasonable
disclosure").
112 See, e.g, Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815, 820-21 (Tenn. 1996) (stating that
spouse seeking to enforce antenuptial agreement must prove full and fair disclosure of the
nature, extent, and value of his or her holdings was provided to the spouse seeking to
avoid the agreement); see also Conley, supra note 18, at 1027 (discussing that full and fair
disclosure does not require "exact and detailed" disclosure of assets). See generally
Counce, supra note 18, at 1054 (explaining full disclosure means nature and extent of
assets).
113 Humphries v. Humphries, No. E1999-02694-R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 455,
at *27-28 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 18, 2000) (explaining that while disclosure need not reveal
precisely every asset owned by an individual spouse, at a minimum, full and fair
disclosure requires that each contracting party be given a clear idea of the nature, extent,
and value of the other party's property and resources). But see Hess v. Hess, 580 A.2d
357, 359 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (stating that full disclosure requires that a reasonable
estimate of the worth of the assets must be attempted so that the general financial
resources of the parties are not obscured). See e.g., Lowe v. Lowe, No. E2000-01456-COA-
R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 401, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2001) (quoting
Randolph, stating "Vhile disclosure need not reveal precisely every asset owned by an
individual spouse, at a minimum, full and fair disclosure requires that each contracting
party be given a clear idea of the nature, extent, and value of the other party's property
and resources.").
114 Humphries, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 455, at *28 (holding that disclosure of the
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needed depends on the particulars of each case.1 15 The party
challenging the prenuptial agreement bears the burden of
proof.ll 6 Further, "in the absence of proof of facts from which
concealment or imposition may reasonably be inferred, fraud will
not be presumed... such a presumption must have as its basis
evidence of overreaching, the concealment of facts,
misrepresentation or some form of deception."17 Courts have
typically looked at substantive fairness at the time of dissolution
on a case-by-case basis.118 This means that an agreement will
only be invalidated with regard to provisions that are
unforeseeable, one-sided or unconscionable at the time of
dissolution not at the time of enforcement or execution.119 In In
Matter of Greiff,120 the New York court examined the burden
nature, extent, and value of a spouse's holdings was unnecessary because the spouse
seeking to avoid the agreement had independent knowledge of the full nature, extent, and
value of the spouse's holdings); see Pite v. Pite, No. FA990429262S, 2001 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 522, at *21 n.4 (Conn. Super Ct. Feb 20, 2001) (explaining that party's general
knowledge of other's assets may be enough to protect against overreaching). See generally
Deach, supra note 80, at 422-23 (explaining that adequate knowledge of the other spouse's
obligations or property is one of a few things that can help to determine enforceability of
an antenuptial agreement).
115 See Judith T. Younger, Perspectives On Antenuptial Agreements: An Update, 8 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAw. 1, 26 (1992) (noting that extent of disclosure varies depending
upon several factors considered by reviewing court). See generally Atwood, supra note 15,
at 138 (indicating that some courts maintain power to review agreement terms); Westfall,
supra note 109, at 1489 (stating court will make findings based on facts presented at time
of trial).
116 See Brandt, supra note 78, at 541 (noting party challenging prenuptial agreement
has burden of proof); Mary McKelvy, In re Mariage of Bonds: California Supreme Court:
Decided: August 21, 2000: 7-0, 30 Sw. U.L. REV. 657, 661 (2001) (stating that challenging
party must carry weight of evidence); Westfall, supra note 109, at 1481 (revealing that
onus of proof lies with challenger).
117 Elgar v. Elgar, 679 A.2d 937, 944 (Conn. 1996) (quoting Matter of Sunshine, 381
N.Y.S.2d 260, 262 (App. Div. 1976)); Matter of Phillips, 293 N.Y. 483, 491 (1944) (cited in
Panossian v. Panossian, 172 A.D.2d 811, 812 (N.Y. 1991). See generally Sally Burnett
Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution on
Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1444-45 (1984) (highlighting that
inequality of terms alone may be insufficient to set aside agreement in "absence of fraud,
duress, overreaching, concealment.").
118 See generally Atwood, supra note 15, at 139 (articulating that analysis is
performed on each case individually); Goldberg, supra note 87, at 1264-65 (proffering that
case specific examination is performed upon dissolution proceedings); Sharp, supra note
117, at 1444 (explaining that judicial approval may be withheld at time of divorce if such
were product of unfair bargaining methods).
119 See McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 267 (Minn. 1989) (asserting that
freedom of contract limits invalidity to conditions unforeseeable at time of execution). See
generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 257 (1995) (purporting that such agreements are afforded a second
look at dissolution); Goldberg, supra note 87, at 1264-65 (explaining court scrutiny at time
of divorce to find altered circumstances not foreseeable at time of contract execution).
120 92 N.Y.2d 341 (1998).
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upon a party to a prenuptial agreement.121 Traditionally, a party
seeking to "vitiate: a contract based upon fraud bears the burden
of proof.122  However, Greiff held "that where parties to an
agreement find or place themselves in a relationship of trust and
confidence at the time of execution, a special burden may be
shifted to the party in whom the trust is reposed ... to disprove
fraud or overreaching."' 23 What causes the burden to shift is a
"specific fact based inequality."124 Therefore, "it is incumbent on
the stronger party to show affirmatively that no deception was
practiced, no undue influence was used, and that all was fair and
open, voluntarily and well understood."125 The question then
becomes whether at the time of execution the nature of the
relationship between the parties was such that it shifted the
burden of proof to the "proponents of the agreement to prove
freedom form fraud, deception or undue influence."26
121 See id. at 343 (determining which party bears weight of persuasion in subsequent
divorce proceedings where premarital agreement has been executed); see also Elgar, 679
A.2d at 944 (noting challenger bears responsibility to proffer evidence sufficient to show
fraud). See generally Shukhman, supra note 6, at 465 (advocating that burden of proof
regarding premarital agreements resides with challenging party).
122 See Greiff 92 N.Y.2d at 344 (noting customary requirement confronting
challenging party); Parker v. Parker, 413 N.Y.S.2d 388, 391 (App. Div. 1979) (upholding
principle that evidentiary burden usually lies with disputing litigant); see also Gordon v.
Bialystoker Center, 45 N.Y.2d 692, 698 (1978) (asserting "fraud vitiates all contracts, but
as a general thing it is not presumed but must be proved by the party seeking to relieve
himself from an obligation on that ground." (quoting Cowee v. Cornell, 75 N.Y. 91, 99
(1878)).
123 Greiff 92 N.Y.2d at 344. See generally E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS § 4.20 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing implications for enforcement of contractual
provisions where parties are shown to share relationship of trust or confidence); Brandon
Campbell, Cohabitation Agreements in Massachusetts: Wilcox v. Trautz Changes In the
Rules But Not the Results, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 485, 506 (2000) (recognizing that
confidential relationships must be scrutinized closely).
124 See Greiff, 92 N.Y.2d at 346 (1998) (noting that court must allow for calibration
and application of these legal principles); Joel R. Brandes, The Validity of Prenuptial
Agreements, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 22, 1998, at 3 (stating that special burden may be shifted to
party in whom trust is reposed to disprove fraud or overreaching); Proponent of
Prenuptial Agreement Bears Burden of Proof N.Y.L.J., Oct. 28, 1998, at 26 (citing Greifl3.
125 Cowee v. Cornell, 75 N.Y. 91, 99-100 (1878) (cited in Greiff v. Greiff, 92 N.Y.2d
341, 345 (1998)); Kevin Livingston, Burton Lays Down Law with Emron Sedgwick Names
New Managing Partner, THE RECORDER, Sept. 14, 2001, at 2 (discussing bill that will
make all prenuptial agreements in state invalid unless voluntarily signed by both
parties); Brandes, supra note 124, at 3 (citing Grei9.
126 Creif, 92 N.Y.2d at 343 (1998); Myrna Felder, Guidance Provided on Two Major
Issues, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 4, 1999, at S6 (quoting Greifi3; Court Decisions, N.Y.L.J., May 10,
1999, at 31 (quoting Greilj.
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ANALYSIS
Lack of independent counsel is not fatal to a prenuptial
agreement.127 The mere fact that a party was not represented is
not enough, per se, to have a marital settlement agreement
vacated or modified.128 The parties must have an opportunity to
consult with an attorney, however, the lack of counsel in the
formulation of a prenuptial agreement can be a factor or serve to
corroborate a claim of fraud, deceit, duress, non-disclosure,
coercion or overreaching.129 Also, the fact that one party was
unrepresented is a factor in determining whether the agreement
was entered into voluntarily.130 The term voluntary determines
whether the parties knowingly entered into the agreement,
which means they understood the "terms or basic effect of the
agreement." 13 1 The determination of whether a party "knowingly"
or "voluntarily" entered into an agreement is decided on a case-
by-case basis, and the court frequently looks to some factors
including, but not limited to, the sophistication and experience of
the parties with regard to business dealings, the time between
the signing of the agreement and the wedding, the length of the
127 See Tenneboe v. Tenneboe, 558 So.2d 470, 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(explaining lack of independent counsel is not enough to invalidate prenuptial
agreement); Barbara Drury, For Richer, For Poorer, THE AGE, April 1, 2002, at 8
(commenting on only times prenuptial agreement may be set aside); Rovella, supra note 7,
at 11 (discussing near impossibility of having agreements set aside).
128 See Cowen v. Cowen, 95 So.2d 584, 585 (Fla. 1957) (explaining incompetent
counsel is not basis for vacating agreement in dissolution proceeding); Bubenik v.
Bubenik, 392 So.2d 943, 944 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (noting lack of legal representation
is not enough to invalidate agreement); McGuire v. McGuire, 385 So.2d 151, 152 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (commenting lack of legal representation is insufficient to modify or
invalidate agreement).
129 See In re Estate of Benker, 416 Mich. 681, 693 (1982) (noting lack of independent
counsel is factor in considering voluntariness of prenuptial agreement); McGuire, 385
So.2d at 152 (commenting in prenuptial agreements lack of independent counsel as
factor); Scott Barancik, Beer Brawl; The Broken Pieces of a Milhonaire Mamage, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, June 9, 2002, at 1H (discussing case where lack of counsel was
argued to be factor in claim of coercion).
130 Bonds v. Bonds, 24 Cal. 4th 1, 22 (2000) (noting fact that one party is
unrepresented is factor in considering voluntariness); see Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So.2d
1111, 1116-17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (discussing parties right to obtain legal advice
while considering validity of prenuptial agreement); Conley, supra note 18, at 1036
(listing opportunity to consult with independent counsel as one relevant factor in
determining if antenuptial agreement is enforceable).
131 Bonds, 24 Cal. 4th at 17-18 (2000) (explaining voluntariness of agreement
considers whether party involved knowingly entered into agreement); see Del Vecchio v.
Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17, 21 (Fla. 1962) (commenting that party having some
understanding of waiver is sufficient to keep agreement enforced); Hafner v. Hafner, 295
N.W. 2d 567, 571-72 (Minn. 1980) (noting party understood purpose of agreement).
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relationship between the engaged couple prior to the signing of
the agreement, and of course the "parties' representation by, or
opportunity to consult with, independent counsel."132 In order for
a prenuptial agreement to be valid it must be "fair, equitable,
and reasonable in view of the surrounding facts and
circumstances." 133  "It must be entered into voluntarily by both
parties, with each understanding his or her rights and the extent
of the waiver of such rights."134 Therefore, and despite the fact
that the parties to a prenuptial agreement are not required to
have independent counsel, it is recommended because often their
interests will be adverse and the independent representation will
help to establish voluntarily and knowingly entering into the
agreement.135 Thus the court in In re Matson36 stated that
independent counsel is strongly advised, "to provide the best
opportunity for both sides to receive objective and independent
information regarding the legal consequences of the
agreement."137 Also, independent counsel is advisable because
132 Humphries v. Humphries, No. E1999-02694, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 455, at *29
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 18, 2000) (listing factors to consider in each case to determine if
parties voluntary entered into prenuptial agreement); see Conley, supra note 18, at 1036
(exploring factors determining parties volutariness of prenuptial agreements); see also In
re Leathers, 309 Or. 625, 629 (1990) (Van Hoomissen, J., dissenting) (noting
sophistication of wife was factor in determining if she fully understood prenuptial
agreement's "effect and terms").
133 Benker, 416 Mich. at 689 (1982) (stating an antenuptial agreement must be fair,
equitable and reasonable to be valid); see also Richard v. Detroit Trust Co., 269 Mich. 411,
416 (1934) (stating law of this state recognizes there must be good faith, fair dealings and
open disclosure for agreement to be valid); Hockenberry v. Donovan, 170 Mich. 370, 380
(1912) (stating in absence of fraud and upon sufficient consideration agreement is valid,
enforceable and not against public policy).
134 Benker, 416 Mich. at 689 (1982) (stating that agreement must be entered into
voluntarily and with parties understanding his or her rights); see also Hockenberry, 170
Mich. 370 at 380 (stating parties must have full understanding of agreement); Chen &
Sambur, supra note 84, at 193 (1999) (stating prenuptial agreement must be entered into
voluntarily and be consistent with public policy).
135 See Leathers, 309 Or. at 630 n.5 (1990) (noting prenuptial agreements made with
advice of independent counsel are more likely to be upheld); Russell Engler, Out of Sight
and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers' Negotiations with Unrepresented
Poor Persons, 85 CAL. L. REV. 79, n.239 (1997) (stating prenuptial agreement is invalid
where only husband had counsel and wife did not); Mike McKee, Bonds Hits Supreme
Court Grand Slam, THE RECORDER, Aug. 22, 2000, at 1 (explaining independent counsel
speaks to voluntariness of agreement).
136 In re Marriage of Matson, 107 Wash.2d 479 (1986).
137 Matson, 107 Wash.2d. 488 (1986) (stating court urges both parties to seek
independent counsel prior to signing premarital agreement); see also In re Estate of
Crawford, 107 Wash.2d 493, 496 (1986) (noting to prevent abuse and overreaching of
dominant party court will look at whether agreement was entered into with advice of
independent counsel and with full awareness of economic and legal ramifications of
agreement); In re Marriage of Foran 67 Wash. App. 242, 256 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing
Matson, 107 Wash.2d 479 (1986)).
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legal policy disfavors waivers of marital rights without the
consultation of independent counsel. 138
Attorney's Obligation to Client (Represented Party)
The relationship between the attorney and his or her client is
that of counselor, advisor and sometimes an intermediary.139
This relationship demands trust and confidentiality.14 0 The first
aspect of this relationship is that the lawyer must be
competent.141 A lawyer is competent to handle a client's case if
she or he has the "legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.", 42 It is
138 Foran, 67 Wash. App. at 251-52 (noting legal policy disfavors waivers in
prenuptial agreements without guidance of independent counsel); see also Matson, 107
Wash.2d. at 488 (noting court insists both parties enter into agreement intelligently
before it will bind parties); Marston, supra note 6, at 898 (stating agreement provisions
which conflict with public policy will not be enforced).
139 Bruce A. Green, Thoughts About Corporate Lawyers After Reading the Cigarette
Papers: Has the "Wise Counselor" Given Way to the 'Hired Gun", 51 DEPAUL L. REV.
407, 417 (2001) (stating lawyers served as intermediaries); Carl A. Pierce, ABA Model
Rule 2.2: Once Applauded and Widely Adopted, Then Criticized, Ignored or Evaded, Now
Sentenced to Death with Few Mourners, But Not in Tennessee, 2 TENN. J. Bus. L. 9, 15
(2000) (discussing how lawyer acts as intermediary and advisor); Sandra E. Purnell,
Comment, The Attorney as Mediator-Inherent Conflict of Interest, 32 UCLA L. REV. 986,
992 (1985) (noting sometimes lawyers act as intermediaries or advisors).
140 See Rachel S. Arnow Richman, A Cause Worth Quitting for? The Conflict Between
Professional Ethics and Individual Rights in Discriminatory Treatment of Corporate
Counsel, 75 IND. L.J. 963, 972 (2000) (stating attorney-client relationship is one of trust
and confidence); Cathyrn C. Dakin, Note, Protecting Attorneys Against Wrongful
Discharge: Extension of the Public Policy Exception, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043, 1045
(1995) (commenting attorney client relationship is one of trust and confidence); Linda Ann
Reid, Note, Crockett and Brown, P.A. v. Courson: Determining the Fee of an Attorney
Discharged 'For Cause'" 47 ARK. L. REV. 725, 747 (1994) (explaining attorney client
relationship is one of trust and confidence).
141 Michelle Craven & Michael Pitman, To the Best of one's Ability: A Guide to
Effective Lawyering, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 983, 983 (2001) (noting ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct require attorney competence); see also Ronald A. Brand, Urn-
State Lawyers and Multinational Practice: Dealing with International, Transnational and
Foreign Law, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1135, 1142 (2001) (stating there is duty of
competent representation of client); Brad S. McLelland, Comment, Attorney Competence
or Lack thereof-Under What Circumstances may an Attorney Handle a Matter in which
the Attorney is not Competent? Is an Ethical Rule Necessary to restrain such an
Attorney? 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 297, 298 (1998) (stating courts will guard defendant's right
to have competent counsel).
142 MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.1 (discussion Draft 1983) (stating "A lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires
legal knowledge, skill thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation."); D. Franklin Arey, III, Essay, Competent Appellate Advocacy and
Continuing Legal Education: Fitting the Means to the End, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
27, 27 (2000) (stating competence is demanded of every attorney); Hon. Kay D. Sloan,
Essay, Competence Means Never Having to Say You're Sorry, 28 STETSON L. REV. 335,
335 (1998) (noting competent representation requires legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for representation).
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true that no attorney is competent in every area of law; however,
in the area of matrimonial law, lawyers are often asked about
other areas of law and personal advice as well.143 The American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers provides in Rule 1.3 that an
attorney should not advise a client in areas in which the lawyer
"is not sufficiently competent."144 It is further suggested that a
matrimonial lawyer should advise and recommend to the client
to consult with other professionals and more competent lawyers
if it is in the client's best interest to do so. 145 New York does not
affirmatively require competence, but instead states that a
lawyer shall not handle a case in which he or she is not
competent.146 New York goes further to require that a lawyer be
a zealous advocate and lists prohibitions of what a lawyer shall
not do in order to zealously represent a client.147
143 See Michael Klausner, Geoffrey Miller & Richard Painter, Symposium, The Law
and Economics of Lawyering, Second Opinion in Litigation, 84 VA. L. REV. 1411, 1414
(1998) (stating lawyer may be incompetent); Lanctot, supra note 71, at 219 (stating
lawyer should not answer questions as to what client should personally do); Stephen McG.
Bundy & Einer Elhauge, Knowledge About Legal Sanctions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 261, 263
(1993) (stating lawyer should not offer advice that is not accurate).
144 The Bounds of Advocacy, American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers Standards
of Conduct, 9 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 7 (1992) (stating attorney should not
advise clients in areas which attorney is not competent); see also Joan F. Kessler, Allan R.
Kortzinsky & Stephen W. Schlissel, Why Arbitrate Family Law Matters, 14 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 333, 334 (1997) (noting American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers
has adopted rules for arbitration); Christine Albano, Comment, Binding Arbitration: A
Proper Forum for Child Custody?, 14 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 419, 443 (1997)
(stating arbitrator must be recognized by bench and bar in jurisdiction as expert in
matrimonial law).
145 The Bounds of Advocacy, American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers Standards
of Conduct, supra note 144, at 7 (stating matrimonial lawyer should suggest client
consult more competent attorneys or professionals if in clients best interest); see also
Meredith J. Duncan, Article, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys. A
System in Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1, n.209 (stating lawyer should be
competent, prompt and diligent in all professional functions); John A. Tisdale, Note,
Deterred Nonapplicants in Title VII Class Actions: Examining the Limits of Equal
Employment Opportunity., 64 B.U.L. REV. 151, 164 (1984) (stating adequacy of
representation requires counsel to be competent).
146 See NEW YORK CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, DR 6-101 (amended 1999)
(stating that a lawyer shall not "handle a legal matter which the lawyer knows or should
know that he or she is not competent to handle, without associating with a lawyer who is
competent to handle it."); Michelle Craven & Michael Pitman, supra note 141, at 988
(noting New York's DR 6-101 does not affirmatively require competence). See generally
Comm. On Profl Ethics, Op. 751 (2002) (discussing how attorney representing
government agency may not undertake more matters than attorney can competently
handle).
147 See NEW YORK CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, DR 6-101 (amended 1999)
(requiring that a lawyer shall not handle a legal matter without adequate preparation or
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him or her); Robert T. Begg, The Lawyer's License to
Discriminate Revoked. How a Dentist Put Teeth in New York's Anti-Discrimination
Disciplinary Rule, 67 ALB. L. REV. 153, 201 (2000) (commenting that New York demands
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Another obligation that the lawyer owes his or her client is
that of diligence.148 A lawyer "should pursue a matter on behalf
of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal
inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever lawful and
ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or
endeavor."149 Although a lawyer has "professional discretion" in
determining how to proceed in a case, he or she should act with
"commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and
with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."150 The client, as a
result, is entitled to the lawyer's honest and candid advice
referring not only to law "but other considerations such as moral,
economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the
client's situation."1 51 Typically the attorney-client relationship is
thought of in terms of one attorney and one client; however, this
is not always the case. A lawyer can also act as an intermediary
between multiple clients.152 Under the ABA Model Rules of
attorneys to be zealous advocates); Christopher N. Wu, Conflicts of Interest in the
Representation of Children in Dependency Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1857, 1865 (1996)
(noting New York mandates "zealous advocacy").
148 See McCoy v. Court of Appeals, Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988) (discussing
diligent attorney); Moores v. Greenberg, 834 F.2d 1105, 1108 (1st Cir. 1987) (specifying
attorney's duty to use degree of skill, diligence, and judgment); Cannon v. Cherry Hill
Toyota, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 147, 162 (D.N.J. 1999) (discussing lawyer's duty to represent his
client with diligence).
149 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (1983); see Carol Rice Andrews,
Highway 101: Lessons in Legal Ethics that we Can Learn on the Road, 15 GEO J. LEGAL
ETHICS 95, 99-100 (2001) (asserting that Rule 1.3 is among most frequently violated rules
of professional conduct); Roger C. Crampton, What Does it Mean to Practice Law 'in the
Interests of Justice" in the Twenty-first Century" Furthering Justice by Improving the
Adversary System and Making Lawyers More Accountable, 70 FORDI-AM L. REV. 1599,
1601-02 (2002) (noting that zealous advocacy, while excised from black letter of Model
Rules, is considered by many lawyers to be their most sacred duty).
15o MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (1983); see Douglas H. Yarn, The
Attorney as Duelist's Friend Lessons from the Code Duello, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 69,
80 (2000) (clarifying that zealous advocacy is limited to representation of parties within
adversarial forum); cf Allen K. Harris, The Professionalism Crisis - The 'z' Words and
Other Rambo Tactics: The Conference of Chief Justices'Solution, 53 S.C. L. REV. 549, 579
(2002) (cautioning that some attorneys may erroneously rely on language in comment to
Rule 1.3 in order to justify excessive and improper practices).
151 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 2.1 (1983); see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Under Shelter of Confidentiality, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 13 (1999) (asserting that
Rule 2.1 permits but does not require counseling beyond the scope of legal advice);
Jonathan M. Hyman, Shp-Shding into Mediation: Can Lawyers' Mediate their Clients'
Problems?, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 47, 75 n.63 (1998) (noting that lawyers are free to advise
clients that stated objectives of client may be unwise, impractical, or immoral).
152 See H. Lowell Brown, A Dilemma of Corporate Counsel Faced with Client
Misconduct Disclosure of Client Confidences or Constructive Discharge, 44 BUFF. L. REV.
777, 811 (1996) (noting lawyer may act as intermediary);Yarn, supra note 150, at 213
(discussing lawyer as intermediary); Jankowski, supra note 47, at 184 n.19 (1993)
(explaining lawyers as intermediaries).
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Professional Conduct an attorney may act as an intermediary
after consultation regarding the implications of the common
representation, including the risks with all clients involved.153
This common representation, such as would be the case in a
prenuptial agreement, is allowed contingent upon the fact that
the lawyer believes that the "common representation can be
undertaken impartially and without improper effect on other
responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients."15 4 The
attorney must also "reasonably" believe that the matter can be
resolved in the best interest of the clients, and, if the suggested
solution is not accepted, that none of the clients will be
materially prejudiced.155 If the attorney is either asked to
withdraw by either of the clients or must withdraw, then the
attorney may not further represent either party in the subject in
which he or she acted as an intermediary. 156
Attorney's Obligation to Unrepresented Party
In a situation such as a prenuptial agreement it is not
uncommon or unheard of for one of the parties to have secured
representation while the other party has not.157 It is clear that an
153 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 2.2(a)(3) (1983); see Dzienkowski, supra
note 51, at 764 (noting that one significant risk of multiple representation is waiver of
attorney-client privilege as among parties); Matt Wise, Current Public Law and Policy
Issues in ADR: Separation Between the Cross-Practice of Law and Mediation: Emergence
of Proposed Model Rule 2.4, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 383, 388 n.26 (2001) (quoting
Model Rule 2.2).
154 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 2.2(a)(3); see Dzienkowski, supra note 51,
at 802 (explaining that traditional duty of loyalty must necessarily be modified in
intermediation context to recognize that lawyer is representing conflicting interests);
Tuttle, supra note 25, at 915 (explaining that rules seek to foster situation where each
client actively directs attorney-client relationship).
155 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 2.2(a)(2); see H. Peter Nesvold, Going
Private or Going for Gold: The Professional Responsibilities of the In-house Counsel
During a Management Buyout, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 689, 716 (1998) (discussing
requirement that attorney reasonably believe that matter can be resolved in manner
compatible with best interests of parties); Alysa Christmas Rollock, Professional
Responsibility: Organization of the Family Business The Lawyer as Intermediary, 73
IND. L.J. 567, 579 (1998) (quoting ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 2.2,
Intermediary).
156 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 2.2(c); see Nesvold, supra note 155, at 717
(noting that once asked to withdraw as intermediary lawyer may not represent either
party), Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 679-80 (2001)
(explaining intermediary lawyer once asked to withdraw may not represent either party).
157 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 4.3 (1983); see also Engler, supra note
135, at 79-80 (emphasizing frequency of legal encounters between attorneys and
unrepresented parties); cf In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 833 (Cal. 2000) (declining
to decide issue of counsel's duty to unrepresented party in premarital agreement but
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attorney has an obligation to his or her client, but the attorney
may also owe an obligation to the unrepresented party.158 The
ABA's Model Rule 4.3 describes the way that a lawyer should
deal with an unrepresented party:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not
represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that
the lawyer is disinterested. When a lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the unrepresented person
misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer
shall make reasonable efforts to correct the
misunderstanding. 159
The comment to rule 4.3 suggests that the only "legal" advice an
attorney may give to an unrepresented party is to seek
representation.160 Although not mandated by the Model Rules or
the NY Code of Professional Responsibility, some courts have
defined the obligation of an attorney to the unrepresented
party.]61 Merely telling a party that you do not represent him or
her may not be enough, but rather an attorney should advise the
party to seek his or her own counsel.162 An unrepresented party
observing that best assurance of enforceability of such agreement is independent
representation for each party).
158 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 4.3; see also id. R. 4.3 cmt. (explaining
that "lawyer should not give advice to an unrepresented person other than the advice to
obtain counsel."); Engler, supra note 135, at 82 (noting that attorney must refrain from
providing legal advise to unrepresented party).
159 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 4.3; see also id. R. 4.3 cmt. (reasoning that
"[a]n unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal
matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested ... even when the lawyer represents
a client."); Engler, supra note 135, at 79-80 (commenting that ethical rules fail to
sufficiently address issues at stake in negotiations between attorneys and unrepresented
parties).
160 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 4.3, cmt. (instructing lawyer to limit
legal advice given to unrepresented persons); NEW YORK CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
DR 7-104(a)(2) (amended 1999) (discussing scope communications with represented and
unrepresented persons); Andrew Horwitz, Taking the Cop out of Copping a Plea:
Eradicating Poh'ce Prosecution of Criminal Cases, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1305, 1324 n.89 (1989)
(quoting ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4.3, Comment).
161 See Abernathy, supra note 76, at 342 (noting courts differ as to what obligation
attorneys owe to unrepresented party). See generally Mark H. Aultman, The Story of a
Rule, 2000 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U.L. REV. 713, 722-23, 737, 741 (2000) (discussing the
evolution of model rules); Smith, supra note 36, at 23-24 (contrasting Louisiana's rules
with model rules).
162 See Abernathy, supra note 76, at 342 (noting it is best for attorney to advise
unrepresented party to seek independent counsel); John R. Price, The Lawyer's Duties
and Liabilities to Third Parties: Article, Duties of Estate Plamners to Non Clients.
Identifing, Anticipating and Avoiding Problems, 37 S. TEX L. REV. 1063, 1074 n.45
(1996) (noting case in which attorney advises unrepresented person to seek independent
counsel before going forward); see also Engler, supra note 135, at 94 (stating that if
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may not understand the adversarial position that the opposing
attorney will have to take if his or her interests are adverse to
the represented party's.163 If an attorney conveys "part of the
story to an unrepresented party with whom the attorney's client
is doing business, the attorney must take reasonable steps to tell
the whole story, not just the self-serving portions of it."164
It is well established that an attorney may only be liable for
malpractice to his or her client.165 However, the rule is not
applicable in all cases. Liability may be incurred to a third-party
in at least two distinct situations. An attorney may be liable to a
third-party beneficiary on a negligence theory,166 or under a
"multifactor balancing test." 67 The balancing test requires the
examination of:
.. the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect
the plaintiff; the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; the
closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct
communication between unrepresented party and counsel is inevitable then counsel may
be required to advise unrepresented to seek independent attorney).
163 David Barnhizer, Princes of Darkness and Angels of Light: The Soul of the
American Lawyer, 14 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POLy 371, n.136 (2000) (quoting
Charles B. Rosenberg, The Law After O.J, A.B.A. J., June 1955, at 72, that most people
do not understand the adversary system); Emily Buss, "You're My What?" The Problem of
Children's Misperceptions of Their Lawyer's Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1738
(1996) (explaining how non-clients may reveal confidences to an attorney not
understanding that s/he may become an adversary's lawyer); see also Rex E. Lee,
Lawyering for the Government Politics, Polemics & Principle, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 595 (1986)
(articulating that one who argues against lawyer's role as advocate for client does not
understand adversary system).
164 Bohn v. Cody 119 Wash.2d 357, 367 (1992) (holding attorneys need to advise
unrepresented parties to obtain independent counsel); see also In re Marriage of Foran,
834 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (looking at reasons why attorney should advise
unrepresented party to seek independent counsel); Engler, supra note 135, at n.241
(quoting Foran).
165 See Bohn, 119 Wash.2d at 364-65 (stating "strict privity" is required for
malpractice claim); Marianne B. Hill, Trends in New Mexico Law: 1994-95: Tort Law
(Legal Malpractice) - Attorneys May Owe a Duty to Statutoiy Beneficiaries Regardless of
Privity: Leyba v. Whitley, 26 N.M.L. REV. 643, 645 (1996) (explaining traditional view
that attorney is only liable in malpractice to client); Christopher G. Sablich, Duties of
Attorneys Advising Financial Institutions in the Wake of the S&L Crisis, 68 CHi.-KENT L.
REV. 517, 517 n.8 (1992) (commenting attorney is liable to client for malpractice).
166 See Stangland v. Brock, 109 Wash.2d 675, 681 (1987) (explaining duty between an
attorney and non-client in will context); see also Bohn, 119 Wash.2d at 365 (stating
attorneys can be liable to third party beneficiaries); Bowman v. John Doe, 104 Wash.2d
181, 188 (1985) (acknowledging that negligence liability does not extend to unlimited
amount of potential plaintiffs).
167 See Stangland, 109 Wash.2d at 680 (observing that duty between attorney and
non-client plaintiff can be grounded on two theories); see also Bohn, 119 Wash.2d at 365
(listing all six factors of multifactor balancing test); Bowman, 104 Wash.2d at 187-88
(noting multi-criteria balancing test).
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and the injury; the policy preventing future harm; and the
extent to which the profession would be unduly burdened by
a finding of liability. The inquiry under this multi-factor test
has generally focused on whether the attorney's services
were intended to affect the plaintiff.168
It appears rather clear that the prudent course for an attorney
representing a party in a premarital agreement is not to give any
advice to the unrepresented party, except to seek independent
counsel.169 If the attorney gives advice to the unrepresented
party, liability may result if the attorney's services were intended
to affect the unrepresented party, and the balancing test favors
the unrepresented party. 170
CONCLUSION
It is very clear that divorce rates are on the rise, and so too are
prenuptial agreements. Accordingly, attorneys in this area need
to know how to protect themselves and their clients from any
possible malpractice. We no know that the laws regarding
prenuptial agreements differ depending upon the jurisdiction,
and as such an attorney should be very aware of the laws in the
jurisdiction. Although independent counsel is not required an
attorney should be very skeptical to represent both parties to
such an agreement. If an attorney finds him or herself in a
position in which a party is unrepresented he or she should be
very careful not to give advice; however, the best advice to give is
to seek independent counsel.
168 Stangland, 109 Wash.2d at 681 (analyzing courts that apply the multi-factor test);
Bowman, 104 Wash.2d at 188 (recognizing California courts focus on affect to plaintiff);
see also McKasson v. State, 55 Wash. App. 18, 28 (Ct. App. 1989) (summarizing rationale
for finding duty).
169 See Engler supra note 135, at 94 (commenting that it is permissible to advise
unrepresented party to seek counsel); Kenneth R. Margolis, Responding to the Value
Imperative: Learning to Create Value on the Attorney-Client Relationsip, 5 CLINICAL L.
REV. 117, 147 n.101 (1996) (explaining attorney should not advise unrepresented party
except to seek counsel); Burnele V. Powell & Ronald C. Link, Proceed of the Conference on
Ethical Issues in Representing the Elderly, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1197, 1242 n.161 (1994)
(quoting New York's Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-104(a)(2)).
170 See BoAn, 119 Wash.2d at 365-67 (discussing attorney's duties to third parties);
see also Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 227-29 (1969) (justifying duty to non-client third
parties plaintiff on public policy grounds); Lucas v. Harem, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 588 (1961)
(restating and applying rules announced).
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